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The European Partianentr..lgursuant to Ru[e 47 of the RuLes of procedure,
referred the fotlouing qrotions for resotutions to the PoLiticaL Affairs Cormittee;
- at its sitting of 17.4.19q0, the nrotion for a resotution (Doc.1-99lE0/rev.)
tabted bv itr LALoR on the situetion in south Lebanonl
- at its sitting of 17.4.19E0, the notion for a resotution (Doc. l-101r80,
tabLed tv ilrs CHARZAT and others on the situation in the itiddLe East;
- at its sitting of 12.1.19E1, thc motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-ll4lg},
tabted by ltlr FANTI and others on the expulsion of pal,estinian mayorsi
- at its sitting of 16.1.1981, the notion for a resotution (Doc. 1-819/gO)
tabted by itr d,ORITIESSON and others on Lcbanonl
- at its sitting ot 14-10.19E1, t.he motion for a resotution (ooc.1-5E3/g1)
tabLed by r{r de ta }IALENE and others on the death of president Anrar e[ sadat
- at its sitting ot 14-10.1981, the motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-sg6lg1,
tabted by trlr FANTI and others on the situation in the fliddLe East;
- at its sitting of 14-10-1981, the notion for a resotution (Dog. 1-601/g1)
tabted by fir van AERSSEN and others on the stabitization and extension of
peace efforts in the iliddl.e East;
- at its sitting of 16.12-1981, the notion for a resotution (Doc. l-Egzlgl)
tabted bv trrr KyRKos on the decision taken by the Israeti Knesset
. to annex the Gotan Heights;
- at its sitting of 18-12-1981, the motion for a resolution (Doc. l-grjzlgl
tabted by ilr EPHREI,IIDIS and others on the 
"nner"iion of the Gol.an Heightsby Israe[;
- at its sitting of 18-12-1981, the notion for a resotution (Doc. 1-906lg1>
tabLed bv Flr SEGRE and lir CARDIA on the annexation of the Gol.an Heights bythe State of Israet i
- at its sitting of 15.2.198?. the notion for a resotution (Doc. 1-9561g1,
tabLed by ltr IIARSHALL and others on the Israeti annexation of the GoLan;
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- at its sitting of ?2.4.1982, the notion for a rcsotution (Doc. 1-15E/EZ)
tabted by ilr KYRKOS on thc occupicd Arab tcrritorics on the lcst Bank and
in thc Gaza StriP;
- at its sitting of 14.6.19t2, thc motion for e rceotution (Doc. 1-353/EZ)
.t:i tr:: *otro.rt ,1 o.Y on the tyct,i lnvarion_oJ southcrn Lebanon,
- at its sitting of 9 JuLy 19E?, the notion for a resolution (Doc. 1-5glE?,
tabled by ttlr GLINNE and others on the imposition of martial. Lar ln thc
territories occupied by Israel.
At its meeting of 29 / 30 tlay 1980, the PoLiticat Affairs Connittce
decided to dray up a report on the matter.
At its meeting of 8 JuLy 1980 it appointed itr pENDERS rapporteur.
It considered the draft report at its mGetings of zl ..1 zE 0ctober
1981, 24 I 26 February 1982, ?2 I 24 fiarch 1982, 23 I zs June 1982, and
19 I 20 0ctober 19E?. At the latter meeting.. the motion for a rdsolution
as a rhote ras adopted by 2E votes to 5 rith Z abstentions.
The fotloring took part in the votc: ilr Rumor, chairrnan; ilr Haagcrup,
1st vi ce-chai rman; ltlr FerEusson, 3rd vi ce-chai rman; trlr Penders, rapporteur;
tttr Barbi, ?,lr Berkhouler, Lord Bethett, l{r Beyer de Ryke (deputizing for tr
Donnez), ilr Bournias, [tlr Capanna(deputizing for ilrs Hamnerich), t{r CarigLia,
[tlrs Charzat (deputizing for ]lr llotchane), tlr Croux (dcputizing for [rlrs Lenz),
ttlr Denis (deputizing for ilr ttlarchais), trlr B. Friedrich, [irs Gaiotti de Biase(deputizing for ilr Antoniozzi), trlr Gayronski (deputizing for ilr Bettiza),
ttlr Habsburg, [tlr Hinsch, ilr von Hassel, t{r Israel (deputizing for itr de La
t{at}ne), Mr Jaquet, l{r Katzer (deputizing for trlr Dil.igent1, ttlr Ktepsch, ilr
Kyrkos (deputizing for ilr Pajetta), [rlr Lomas, tlr Van ilinncn (deputizing for
tilrs Van den Heuvet), ilr il,onmersteeg (deputizing for tlr Deschanps), ilr l{oorhouse(deputizing for Sir James Scott-Hopkins), Lord OrHagan, ilr prag (deputizing
for Lady Ettes), lrlr RomuaLdi, ilr Schatt, frlr Schieter, l{r Segre and }lr tJalter(deputizing for ltlr Zagari).
</and i
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The European ParLiamentr..\pursuant to RuLe 47 of the RuLes of procedure,
referrec the foLloring Fotions for resoLutions to the poIiticat Atfairs Committee;
- at its sitting of 17.4.1QE.9, the motion for a resotution (Doc. l-99lE0/rev.)
tabted bv itr LALoR on the'situetion in South Lebanonl
- at its sitting of 1?.4.19E0, thd notion for a resotution (Doc. l-101r80,
tabled by ilrs CHARZAT and other$ on thc situation in the ]tiddl.e Easti
- at its sitting of 12.1.19E1, th+ motion for a resotution (Doc.1-l?4tg1,
tabLed by irr FANTI and otherc oJ an. exputsion of patestinian mayors;
- at its sitting of 16.1.1981, thf notion for a resotution (Doc. l-Elglgo)
tabLed by Flr d,ORTiESSON and oth{rs on Lcbanonl
- at its sitting of 14-10.19E1, the motion for a resotution (Doc. 1-5gs/g1) ttabted bv t'lr de ta IIALENE and sthers on the death of president Anyar e[ sadat
- at its sitting ot 14-10.19E1, the notion for a resotution (Doc.1-5g6lE1)
tabLed by frtr FANTI and others on the situation in the t{iddLe East;
- at its sitting of 14.10-1981, the notion for a resotution (Do.c.,1-601/g1)
tabted by ftlr van AERSSEN and others on the stabiLization and extension of
peace efforts in the iliddte Easti
- at its'sitting of 16-12-19E1, the ootion for a resolution (Doc. l-Egzlglt
tabted by itr KYRKOS on the decision taken by the Israeli Knesset
. to annex the GoLan Heights;
- at its sitting of 1g.12.1981, the motion for a resotution (Doc.1-goztgl
tabLed by ilr EPHRET{IDIS and others on the 
"nneraiion of the GoLan Heightsby Israet;
- at its sitting of 18-12-19E1, the notion for a resolution (Doc. 1-go6tg1,
tabted by ttlr SEGRE and I'lr CARDIA on the annexation of the Gotan Heights bythe State of Israet;
- at its sitting of 15-?-1982. the motion for a resotution (Doc. 1-g56lE1)
tabted by ttlr I.IARSHALL and others on the Israeti annexation of the Gotan;
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- at its sitting of 2?.4.1982, the motion for a rcrotution (Doc. 1-15ElE?)
tabLed by tr KYRK0S on thg occupicd Arab tcrritorics on thc lost Sank tnd
in thc Gazr Strip;
- at its sitting of 14.6.19E2, the not{on for a rcrotution (Doc. 1-353/EZ)
.":l,ed by llr *ntroar, *1 o,y on the llecl,i 
_lnvasion 
of Southern Lebanon,
- at its sitting of 9 Jul,y 1982, thc motion for a resotution (Doc. l-SgtE?,
tabted by ttlr GLINNE and others oh the imposition of martiaL l.ar in the
territories occupied by Isracl.
At its neeting of ?9 I 30 tay 19E0, the PoLiticat Affairs comrnittee
decided to dray up a report on the matter.
At its neeting of E Ju[y 19E0 it appointed ilr PENDERS rapporteur.
rt considered the draft report at its mretings of ?? -.1 ?E 0ctober
1981,24 t 26 February 1982,2? t 24frarch lg|8,zr 23 t 25 Junc 19E2, and
19 I 20 October 1982. At thc tatter meeting., the motion for a rtisoLution
as a yhote ras adopted by 2E votes to 5 yith Z abstentions.
The fottowing took part in the vote: f,r Runor, cheirman; ilr Haagcrup,
1st vice-chairman; [tlr Fergusson, 3rd vice-chairman; trlr Pcnders, rapporteur;
Itlr Barbi, trlr Berkhourer, Lord BetheIt, l{r Beyer de Ryke (deprtizing for ilr
Donnez), [tlr Bournias, ilr Capanna(deputizing for lirs Hammerich), ilr Carigtia,
Itlrs Charzat (deputizing for ilr trlotchane), trlr Croux (deputizing'for l{rs Lenz),
ilr Denis (deputizing for ltlr ltlarchais), t{r B. Friedrich, [rlrs Gaiotti de Biase(deputizing for l{r Antoniozzi), llr Gayronski (deputizing for ilr Bettiza),
ilr Habsburg, ltlr Hinsch, ltlr von Hassel, ttlr Israel (deputizing for llr de [a
ilattrre), Mr Jaquet, ilr Katzer (deputizing for t{r Ditigentl, trlr Kl.epsch, ilr
Kyrkos (deputizing for [tlr Pajetta), trlr Lomas, Irlr Van ]linncn (dcputizing for
ttlrs Van den Heuvet), t{r ilomnersteeg (deputizing for }lr Deschanps), ilr }loorhouse(deputizing for Sir James Scott-Hopkins), Lord 0rHagan, lir prag (deputizing
for Lady Et[es), frlr Romuatdi, ttlr Schat[, frlr SchieLer, ilr Segre and trlr tdatter(deputizing for ltlr Zagari).
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AThe PoIitical. Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European ParLiament
the foLtoring ilotion for a Resotution, together Hith exptanatory statement:
EgUg!_E9B_4_8ESgturr9!
on the situation in the iliddl.e East
The Eurooean Par
-------!ieEs!!
A. desiring e comprehensive, just and tasting peace setttement in the
MiddLe East,
B. desiring a solution to the probtems of the Lebanon that yitt ensure
the indepcndence, sovereignty and integrity of that country and the
security and further deve[opment of the different peoples Living there,
C. having regard to Resolutions Nos. 242 and 338 of the United Nations
Security Counci [,
D. recatLing its resotution of 11 October 1978 on the resutt of the
conference at Camp David and its resolution of 26 April 1979 on the
signing of the peace treaty betveen Egypt and IsraeL and the contri-
bution of the C'ommunity to a comprehensive peace setttementl,
E. having regard to the statcment on the !,lidd[e East by the European
CounciL on 13 June 1980 in Venice,
F. wetcominE the participation of four EEC lrlember States in the Sinai
muttinationaL peace-keeping force and the participation of trlo t{ember
States in the internationat peace-keeping force in Lebanon,
G. noting the Fahd P[an, made pub[ic for the first time on 7 August 1981,
H. recatLing its resolutions of 12 0ctober 1g7Er 10 Aprit 19E1, ?? ApriL
198?,17 June 1982,16 september 19EZ and 15 October 1gE?, on the)
Lebanon-,
1 o..l tto. c 261, 6.11 .197E
OJ No. C 127, 21 .5.1979' P. 59
2 o, t,o. c ?61, 6.11.19?E. p. 3E
0J No. C 101 , 4.5.19E1 , P. 11?
OJ No. C 1?5, 17.5.1982' 9. 79
OJ No. C 1E?, 19.7.1982, P. 52
0J No. c ?67, 11.10.19E2
0J No.
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I.
J.
L.
f'l .
having regard to various statemcnts on Lebanon by the European GounciL
and the Foreign Affairs tlinisters mecting in potiticat cooperation,
taking the vicr that the de facto annexation by Israel of East Jerusalem
and the Golan Heights, the sctttement policy pursued in the Gaza Strip
and on the Uest Bank and the policy of dismissing elected mayors in the
Uest Bank are not compatibLe rith progress torards a comprehensive peace
sett Iement,
K. beLieving that recent events in the area, such as the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon, the Israeti siege of b'lest Beirut and the uar betueen Iraq and
Iran have made the need for a potiticaL solution of the Arab-Israel.i
confIict even more urgcnt,
deptoring the assassination of President Beshir Gemayet, President of
the Lebanese Republic, the subsequent entry of Israeti forces into hJest Beirut,
and the massacres .in the Patestinian camps in September 19E2,
having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by ltlrs Charzat and
others on the situation in the iliddLe East, the motion for a resolution
tabLed by ttlr Lalor on the situation in Southern Lebanon, the motion for
a resolution tabted by llr Fanti and others on the exputsion of Patestinian
mayors, the motion for a resotution tabled by ttlr dlormesson and others on
Lebanon, the motion for a resotution tabled by ilr van Aerssen and
ftlr BLumenfeld on the stabitization and extension of peace efforts in the
f,liddLe East, the motion for a rcsotution tabted by trlr Kyrkos on the
decisjon taken by the Israeti Knesset to annex the Golan Heights, the
motion for a resolution tabled by trlr Ephremidis and others on the
annexation of the Golan Heights by Israel, the motion for a resoLution
tabted by ttlr Segre and [tlr Cardia on the annexation of the GoLan Heights
by the State of Israat, the motion for a resotution tabLed by t{r trtarshaLl.
and others on the Israeli annexation of the Golans, the motion for a
resotution tabted by ilr Kyrkos oh the occupied Arab territories on the
trlest Bank and in the Geza Strip, the motion for a resotution tabled by
Itlr Romuatdi and others on thc Isracti invasion of Southern Lebanon, and
the motion for a resoLution tabLed by trlr Gtinne and others on the im-
position of martiaI tar in the territories occupied by rsraeL;
hav'ing regard to the report of the poLiticaL Affairs committee,
(Doc. 1-7E618T,
N.
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1. Is convinccd that Resolutions 242 and 338 of the
Counc'i I constitute a good and rorkablc frameyork
peace settlement in the iliddte East;
United Nations Security
for a comprehensive
2.
3.
4.
5.
Is convinced that the Camp David agreements can and must be a sound
basis on which to buiLd a setttcment of the Arab-Israeli conflict;
Notes, hotever, that a ney initiative ril.t be necessary if the
negotiations on autonomy in the Canp David context faiL;
Considers the Venice Dcctaration as
such a sett lenrent;
Is of the opinion that any European
footsteps of Camp David, and shouLd
the United States;
a usefuI contribution touards
initiative should foLtoy in the
therefore be coordinated yith
Appreciates the proposats madc on 1st September 198? by president
Reagan as a means of giving a nGU impetus to the Canp David process;
Urges the European CounciL and thc Foreign ttlinisters meeting in
poLiticaI cooperation to start from the foItoring principtes:
7.1. the use of force and annexation is unacceptable as a neans of
gaining controI of territory,
7.2.. IsraeL must cnd the occupation of territories hetd since 1967,
7.3. the sovereignty, territoriaI integrity and independence of every
State in the region, incLuding Israe[, must be upheLd together
yith their right to tive in peace uithin secure and recognized
boundaries,
7.4" seLf-determination for the Patestinian peopte to be irnpl.emented
by a procedure compatible rith the right of Israel to qxistence
and security as part of a comprehensive peace settlement,
inctuding the option of a possibte Palestinian State;
Takes the view that the Fahd Ptan in the form adopted by the Arab
Summit at Fez in Septcnber 19E2 contains usable eLements;
Considers that thc Palestinians themsetves shou[d decide by yhom they
are to be represented, and that the PLO can onty be accepted as a
Legitimate participant in the negotiations yhen att paragraphs of
its charter caLting expIicitty or impIicit[y for the destruction of
Israet are formal.Ly deteted;
6.
7.
E.
9.
-7- PE 73.1661fin.
11.
10. Considers it essential for lgrael and the Palestinian peopte, inctuding
the PLO, to hotd talks rith cach othcr end to initiate a proccss Leading
to mutuaI acceptence and recognition;
Urges the European CounciI and the Foreign I{inisters meeting in poLitica[
cooperation to consutt rith thc United Stetes on Lebanon yith a viey
to securing:
(a) the nithdrarraI of aI t f oreign troops;
(b) thc stationing in Beirut and other parts of thc country of an
international peace force in uhich the EEC ilember States routd
plrticipate, preferabty to reptace UNIFIL;
(c) the disbanding of the mititias;
(d) the reestabIishnent of an cffcctive Lebrncse potice force and
Lebanese armed forces;
(e) the rebui Lding of the Lcbanesc state and Lebanese society in a
manner that does justice to atl sections of the popul,ationi
Takes the viev thet any contribution from the European Conmunity and
its [tlember states to a comprchcnsive setttcment must incLude the
foI Lori ng:
12.1. an offer to make Member State contingents avaiLabte to a peace-
keeping force, possibty under uN auspices,. to ensure observance
of mititary and security provisionsl
1?.?. offers of economic, financial. and technicaL aid to att States in the
area and to the Patestinian peorrLe as participants in the settLement;
Considers that, in'the meantime, the European Community and its ilember
states must continue suppLying hunanitarian aid, particutarty to
Lebanonl
Takes thc vier that thc authorlty of any comprehensive peace setttement
wi I' L uttimatety depcnd on a uN Security counci r. for.tou-up resotution
to Resolution 24?, naking cxpr.icit reference to the state of rsraer.
and to the right to seLf-determination of the patestinian peopl,e;
1?.
13.
14.
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15. Instructs its prcsldent to forrard this rcsotution to the Comr$t.io-;r-
CounciL and foreign nlnlsters nectlng ln poLiticaI cooperation, to
the parLilments of thc llcnber Stetcs of the Comnunity and to the
Sccrctrry-Gcneral of the Unitcd ]latlons organilation.
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EXPI.ANAIORY S'TATE,IEM
PA8f, I: TTIE MIDDI,E ELST
Introduction
l. The strategic locatiqr of the trlidrrr..: Il.ist and thc resotgces its countries
possess rEan that c\rents in the area directry affcet natiqls even&here. rt is
gnssibJc to disccrn tur, basic Jr.rir:ds i.n tll.. recont history of the ar:o.r uhieS
tlLty llu^, servc L() ltEus this r.q)Ort.
2. These are:-
(1) A semi-coronialist period, considerabry infruered by Britain
and France, lasting until the early I960s, &ninated by the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
(2) Since the Suez crisis and the e-arly1960S Ue errergence of
the Middle East as an area of sorriet-Anerican tensions, and
the doninance of the palestine g,estion in the Arab_rsraeli
conflict.
3' A third ancl inqrcrLant situation bcalre increasingly evident in the early
1970s: nanery the deprendence of the industrialized nations of lrtestern Europe,
Japan, the United states, and possibly in the future, of the soviet union, upon
the encrgy resources of the oil-prodring co,ntries of the Mirvlle East.
4' Pirrally, in view of the traditionar ties and comrcn interests on a religiors
and cultural revel uhich so obviopsry also link Euope to the Middle Fast, it is
beconing increasingry clear that the Errropean cqnrnrnities nour harre a rore to prayin helping to bring about a just peace and stable cpnditions in the area. This rore
must be performed by the European community in consort with the unitedStates.
l. T.r.._ .4f-*_--t_".t S.lf of Palestine.-c9f,Ll.+9!. 
.a!_d- 
-tE- -Q1e. F.t +91
5' Any true understanding of the present situation in the l{idd.le East must
take into account the rong history of nationalism and international inrrolraenrentin this troul:led area. rt is crear that enornpus barriers of historical, rerigiotrs
and cultural antagonisns, natiq,alisn and suspicion have to be overcqre if peaceis to bc broughr to thc Mi<kilc East.
6' Ttre Barfour Dcclaration of 1917, supJrcrtirg thc creation of a Jenpish l{oflE inPalestinc, for exanrl>Ic, follcr*-'cl Ln L922 by thc British litancl.tte over palestine,
c'nsrtred that control of tlrc rcrgicrr foll to the British covcrrurent after uf,r. tllanfour hundred years of rure by thc ortqnan r\.rrks. rn I94z the Generar Assembryof the united Nations recommended a division of palestlne into Jewish anttArab scctors which would nork together in economic cooperationr whireJerusalem hras to recei.ve international status. rsraer accepted the
_10- Pe T.Ms lfin.
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prgposed division, the Arabs rejected it, and this plan, together with
the declaration of. independence ty Israel, rarlcd the beginning of a
period in the history of the Hiddle East drich uas to be dmtinated by
the Arab-Israel.i .confLict, a conflict rhich four uars uere unable to
resolve- It gradually became clear - particularly after the 1967 yar -
that the Palestinian factor was assuaing an incrcasingly significant
and independent dimension. Folloring the 1973 uar, reneued attenPta
were made to achieve a settlement through thc Unitrd llatione. Ifouever,
nothing came of the Geneva Conference. fn the ensuing lrcriod the
United states initiated moves to secure bilaterlI agrcerents in the
itiddle East, and it sas largely thanks to thc efforts of Dr trissinger
that disengagement a(rreements sere concluded betveen EgyPt, Israel and
Syr i a.
a) Carp_ Davjd: lq,rards-a Pglce setllettErt in tjt ltidlc East
1. A.raluable breakthrough in a solutiqr to tln Ardrtsreli tsrflict, lxrt:rrcr,
was to cqrE folloring the visit of tlc Eglptian Pr.eaitr,r tlr AnEr et Sadat to
Jerusal€rn in llOrenber 1977. nis sPeech to tie f,rEss€t patcd t ta my for a
reciprocal ^/isit by tlE Isr€Ii Prire frdnisEer, trE Bcgin, ta IsEiIia and tlE histcic
swndt cuference betreen the tHo lea&rs and thit€d Stttea Plegifuit CArtlr at
Canrr Dtrvid in Septenser l9?8. llcre, Urey 4l€ed (rr a ''fransork for peace in t}le
!,li,ldle East" and pralained their intentioal to rlerh a 'jrrst, ccnprehensive ard
dr:rable settleflEnt" throi]gh the u-rcrrc]usiqr of peace traties based on ResolutidE
242 and 338 of tlc united Nat.ions seqlrity cot tEil. (See AntE'( f ' )
g. Ihe Ca.o navii Agrearents pro\ri6 for tln srilusion of tle Eglptian-
Israeli Pcace TreatJ- of 26 !'l,arch 19?9 and sturld be !o@n .ul tJE first ilQortant
step in the direEtion of a corpretrcnsive and peaceful s€ttleltEnt of the t'liddle
East conflict
calp_Pey]_a_-_ Meryi Points 
-oLBejlglt-Iglgt
9. Ttre agreerrcnts dealE with fou: nrain isslEs I :
- Peace - a cessation of hostilities,
- 
withdrawal - an end to Israeli ndtitary occr.patiol of the t'lest Bank and the
C,aza SUiP,
- SecuriLy - for all Parties involved;
- 
Autorcfiy for the Palestinian pe<411e.
(i) Iiest Bank and Gaza
10, Ihe propasals o.rLlined a prG€ss of clranEe r*rich Presi&nt Cartcr saw as in
keeping with Arab and Palestinian ho;-s, rdrile also respecting Israel's vital
security interesEs. inhabitants of the filest Bank an(l Gaza strip rere to be given
the right to full adninistrative autonomy for a transiticral period of five years,
altirough the final status of these zones was to be the subject of neg'otiaticls
durinq the trahsiLional period betrreen EgDEt, Isrcl, Jordan and the Palestiniatl
representatives of these areas. A nujor prdlen i3 that the terding of the franerrcrk
covers se\reral corre-ptions of autonoty.
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(iil Eg]lf:ly
ll. ,ltre Agreorents ainEd to pnwi<Ic' l.rt tt*, secrrrity (,l'.rtl tlc parties
inrrolved - including tsraei - so [tnt nare need fear attrck or nilitary threats
fron any otfer.
During tte transitiqral period, Isrrel iras, therefore, to oqrtintE to rEn
spcified garrisons, utrile furestic ser:Urit-y was to be ensurcd by a laal police
for<u,
A variety of security arrangefients r€re outlincd to reinfore Perce betlGert
Israel and its neighbors.
(iii) Autqrcny for tte Palestinian People
12. Carp David also provided that Eg$>t, Isrel, Jordan and repre*ntatives
of the Palestinian peqle sfulld take part in negotiatiqrs to solve all rRrcctc of
the palestinian problenr and that any soluticr to errerge fron negotiaticts tutst
recognise ttre 'legitimate rights and just reqrrirerentsr of the Palestinian pqle.
( iv)
13. Ttre Agreorcnts signed at Canp David also prwi&d the frrcrcrk for tte
cqrclusion of a peace treaty betreen Eglpt and Isrrel . ltc lteaty reaffimcd tle
sigrnatories' adherence to the Cap David Accords. It provi&d also for:-
- an end to the state of wari
- thc rcturn to EgyIrL of t:tre Sinai Peninsula c'aptured by Isrrel in 1967;
- the recognition by Egfrpt of the state of Israel, providirg ther€by for tie
establishnent of 'nornal and friendly' relations tltrorgh tle ochmge of
amlxrssadors and tr*k qx.rring of cultural and tra& channcls bctr.reen the
tr,r> sides.
14. President Carter's initiative to bring peace to the t{idle East, and the
concl.usion of the Peace Trea'"y was considered at the tirre to be of great historical
irrportance. It hras fiQed that the AgreerEnts and the I?eaty rurld relerate tle
nrjvefiEnt towards a new era of reconciliation in the lliddle East. ltc Crovernnents
of the (then) Nine ELt [.len$er States, for exarrl.rlc, endorsed the Carter initiative
and expressed their hope that the outeqrrr of C.lryr David rurld be a dajor step on tlc
road to a lasting peace.
15. In April 1979 a resoluticn of the Eurolrcan Parliancnt on tlE signing of ttE
Peace Treaty lxrtwten Eqyrt eirl Isrlcl warmly wrlcqred tte crrrrlusicn of ttrc Treaty.
It urqcd that the Nine sltottld do all itr thoir Fr.r:r t-o intensify thc exsisting links
lrcthr-'cn the Crrmunity, Eqypt and Israel and enphasiscd tle &sire <lf the Elurcpean
Parlianent to seek to nuke an effcc'tivc contrihution to the Cqnnrnityrs efforts to
assist in the achieverent of a c-atpretrensir,re settlur:nt.
I 
,r.r c 127/59 ut 2r.5.1979 (Doc-. az/:,gl
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b) Progresgsince Canp_Pavid
15. Ho/vever, hopes that the peace settlefiEnt contained the seeds of a secure
and peaceful future proved premature. It is irrcreasingly recogrnised that the
Cap David Agre€rEnts, fuporEant as they are and sltorld remain, cannot be seen as
oonstituting a sufficient basis for a corprehensive agreeflEnt. Briefly, a nr.n&er of
e\rents have senred to ccrlprqldse tte chanc€s of achieving a just and lasting pead€.
(i) Plo._gtd_-053!. :g:SS! rol 
-o_ille_ -c-ary. Pgytq jgrgelmlnt g
17. olre of the mcst siqnificant of these events was the rejrcLion of the
Agreefi€nts by other Arab States and by the PLo, wtro refused to accept Agreenents with
whose negotiation they had not been associated. It was believed that the Agreerents
could not contribute to any final and positive solution, and Presi&nt Sadatts
ildication of his readiness to negotiate with the €o€fltfr Israel, was considered a
rprtal sin, uttich 1ed to the inrediate econqnic and political boycott of Eglpt by
tlp other Arab states. rt is clcar that the suecess of any future peace rpves,
therefore, rests on the pronotion of broa&r based contacts than those of Carp David
to include representatives frcrn all the countries and parties inrrolrred in the
Palestinian dispute, including the PI.o.
(ii ) Pa_lest ini-an 
_au-toncmy_ g_qq 
-tlp. .l-s-r_ae.l.i. ..Ti!J.l::rlg'!.Ln
18. the nain failure of the carwo David Agreerent ries in the inabirity or
unwillingness of Israel to grant any neaningful autoncrfly to the Palestinians on t-he
tJest Bank or in the Gaza strip. so far, it has not even been possibre to
find Palestinians prepared to take part in negotiations on autonomy, not
least because many Palestinians fear that participation would put their
lives in jeopardy. The Israeli Goverrurent's policy of rapidly
founding rlew scrtLleflEnts and cxp.ilcling Lhosc that already e:rist on t-he lJest Bank
is inconpatible with the spirit of Canp David. It also reans that the prospect of
serf-detcrmination for thc t)alest-ini,ans is lrct'rming ilx:rcasingly rornte. The further Israeti actimin March 1982 of deposing the Arab mayors of Et-Bireh, Nabtus and Ramattah, on the-grounds of their pro-PLO sympathies, Has the signat for serious disorders in the
West Bank, which cost severat Iives.(iii) Jerusatem
19. nolTiliifrTlE Camp David .1qrecrrcnts, in lLrrch 1979 Prinre Minister Begin also
stressed the Israeli view of the stat'us of Jcrusalern'as the indivisi-ble capital of -
Israel. In JuIy 1980 the Israeli :Gesset adopted a law on the annexation of East
Jenrsarern - technicarry part of the west Bank - procrairning it the capitar of
rsraer. the Arab i{orrd, Eglpt incruded, condemned this npve. rn the FAgD-pran,
Jenrsalem is nentioned as the capital of the palestinian State.
(iv) The wi&r context
20. The Aral:-Israeli conflict and the Palestine problern have beccnre increasingly
interrnoven with other conflicts and poler strugglcs insi& the region. The revolution
'il
!
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in Iran, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the lran-Iraq war have created
nerr, areas of tension and new instabilities, rendering a just and corprehensitre
settlerEnt of the Arab-Israeli conflict on Lhe one hand all the npre \rrgent and on
the otier hand aII the npre difficult. Ttre Icbanon has nrcre and ]IEre beccne a rew
battlefield in the Arab-Israeli crcnflict. Changes in Ehe dispositions of aned
personnel and r.eaponry in the Lebanon harrc becqne related to the said conflict.
(v) Recent develofrents
ZL. 1981 was rnarked by a nurnber of spectacular cvents. Ttre assassination of
prcsident Sadat thrcw into rclicf noL only tlrc irq:ortartt:c lut also the vulnerability
of the Canp David Agre€fiEnts, Sadatts policy has been continued by l'tubarek, his
successor, but in ghat rreasure he will atternpt to inprove relatiqts with the other
Arab States is not yet clear. l,Eanwtrile, four Cqrmtrnity f,tsfl&er States (France,
Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdon) have agreed to send contingents to the
Slnai peace-keepingforce, whose task is to ensure that the Peace treaty bet$reen EgyPt
a.<I Israr.l is tlrly <jr:;('rvrrl. 'Itp 6t-lr.r'Crrrrrrrutily Ft.rrlr.r Slnt(.ri lutvr. t.tttkrrstxl t.ltis
trptre as a step tor*ards a ccrprehensitle peace settlefient. based on mutual acceptance of
the principle that alL states in the region har,rc a riglrt to exist and enjoy security,
and on the need for the Palestinian people to exercise fully its right of self-
determination. the United Kingfun can justifiably lok back with satisfaction on
this achieverrcnt of the British Presidcncy. Itrc parti<:i1:ation of the four Cornunity
!€rber States is also to Israel's advantage, since it i.lplies, albeit indirectly,
their ccrmitrEnt to the Canp David process and hence to the security of Israel.
A fgrther significant der,relopnent was the plan proposed by Crown Prince Eahd of
Saudi Arabia (Annex 6).
22. The plan provides for the creation of .r Palestinian State with Jcrusalem as
its capital ancl rccognizcs the right of all sLates in ltre region to live in peace,
a formulation which could be construed as recognition of the State of r.srael. While
the plan requires extensir,re clarification and obviously cannot. be directly fuplenented,
it is a point of departure for further discussion. Ihe plan afford.s Eg)rPt a chance
to end its isolation within the Arab r"or]d and is for this very reason of rnajor
in[)ort(rn('o to I:;rac'l .rs r't.11. Il- is thorefr:rt'excccdingly ret;rc'ttab!c- that Israol
de-e.rnecl rL ncccsisary to pru'c<'d wit-h t-lx. !!'-_t_+!: anttcx;tLi<,tt o[ tlrc C'olan lleigtrts in
December 1981, and atso to reptace its miIitary administration in the West
Bank by a civitian one, which wcs seen by the Palestinians as a step away
from autonomv. 
-(i/i f "' The REaqdif A&ninistration
23. It was extrerE|Iy difficult to prcdict the direction thatthe ner^r Arrcrican
AdninisLrati<.:n wouLd follcps rurdcr President Reagan, and eten no^r a degree of uncertainty
renrains. fn recent nonths, therc have bc-,en indications that in the Middle East, and
particularly ir, thc CuIf area, Washington has been rDre concernd with curbing Sirviet
influence than with solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Ho^re\rer, the United States has
also, on a nuit-r of occasions, provided sufficient evidence that it is genuinely
aware of its responsrbilities as thc nr.rjor guar;rntc:r of Isracl's se<'r.rrity.
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l6vertheless, hfiile Washington has reached a 'strategic crnsenliust with Israel, the
ncst slEctacular arrre &aI has been sitruck with Saudi Arabia.
24. Ttre willirrgness of four Ccmnlrity lGrber Stat€s to cqltritxlte to tlp Sinai
peace-keepirq force, the prrrpose of r*rich is to ensur.e continr.red peace be&een Eqipt
and Israel has &ubtless bcen a soirrce of cqrsiderable satisfaction to tle United States.
Ilrc intcrcst skxln by tln l.ritor in t-lr'plan lrrclxr.sc<l l>y Cro*r Princn Fahd of Sbrrdi Arahia
and discussed at greater length bctovr prmits the cautious conclusion that Washington is
seeking not only to resohre the Arab-Israeli conflict but also to enlist the sr4porE of the
no&ratc Arab States against ttE So\riet Union. For the United States it hotrld, itoe'.er,
seenr adrrisable to arioid giving distirrct priority to ttE East-lrtest oqrfrontation in the
Middle East, since csrtinuaeion of the Arab-Israeli cqrflict rnrld provi& the Sotriet
l,Jnion h,ith botn nptir,rc and qportunity for extc.ndinq its influen<:e in the area.
(vii) EiB' attitude to the Palestinian PloblEtt
25. A changc in EEf, attitudes tovarrls ttE Middle East has q'curred largely as
a result of t}e inereasing inportance of the Palestine question over the trESt few
years. Ttc United Kingdcnr and the tletherlands, for exaq>le have gublicly &lared
their support for the Palestinian &nand for ttre right to self-detennination. the
French Go'rern[Ent has made a staterrEnt in which it opts for a Palestinian State.
In vic,lr of this change, the apparent inpa-s.se over thc Canp David Agrc\c(Ents and the
serious corljeclrcnccs that could rcsult frqn it, Europc needs no^r to assert its
inflrence to prorros(! ncw boses for discussicm, using the canp David Agreemnts as
tlre nccessary foundation ulrcn rrrtrich to tr'rild tiurq;ean policies.
_r_tF_P_19_eIqg!p___e-.!_egQq_i.a11i_s_s_15'
26. Afthouqh the Palestinians have been engaged in resistance since the
beginning of the century, the ppular resistance rov€rrEnts of today only really
began to enFrge since the 1948 war and rrotal.rly aftcr the Palestinians' defeat
and subr;eclucnt Isracli occul:ation of Sinai and thc Gaza Strip in 1956 - the
enErgence of terrorism and g:rrerrilla tactics being seen as the consequence of
the nnnife.t, Arab inferiority in ntbile warfare.
27. In 1956, for exarqcle, a clandestine Palestiniiu ltrab nationalist organisation,
'Al Fatah' was fornr:d by a srnall qroup of Palostjnian cxiles in the Gaza Strip.
Tltcn, i.rr I9(,4, Llx'Aralr Coverrurentri nL{)tlng in Cairt, cstablisltcd tlrc Palestinian
Lil>cral.i()n ()rg.lnis(rti(nl, ir)tll as a cenl.ral founn for tln P.rlcst inianr; and as an
instruncnL ol' Aralr r'oltLr<.rl.
28. In the aftermath of the 1967 war, ho^Ever, the cult of the Eedayeen - or
'Freedon Fighters' - bagan to sr,leep through the Arab countries and a wtrole range
of (fuerrilla groups sprang up. Today, the PI.o co(prises serreral diverse groups
c)
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pledged to the recovery of the L'alestinian land and to the establislurent of a
Palestinian State (see Annex 2). Since 1969, AI Fatah has arcrged as the nrcst
porerful and best organised of the resistarrce mcvsrEntsr its lea&r Yasser Arafat
becarp Chairrnan of the PI.o in that year.
Aims and ip_legt_ives qLllEJUL
29. Ttre officially declared airn.-'f r-hc ['L0 is to re-establish a state of
Palestine and to secure reeognition of t-hc rcfugeos' right to return. Ihe '
Palestine National Charter - or Coven;rnt ot the PI.o - arrended by the Palestine
National Council (the Parlianent of the Plo) in July 1968 sets cr.rt the cqrrcn
political FrograrrrrE of the various Palestinian npvsrents and goes scrr€ uay to
spetling out a future constitution (see Annex 3). Ttre guiding prirciples of the'
Covenant are as follo'is:
- In the future Palestinian state citizenship will be granted orly to those Jer*s
who ha',re Iived in Palestine since before 1917 (article 5),
- The Jeqs are no't a nation and conseguently pos*ss neither the right to self-
&termination nor the right to an independent state (article 20),
- Ttre Palestinian preople are a nation and are tlerefore alone entitled to self-
deEcrminatiorr and nay claim lrcsscssion of ttrc whole and undivided territory
of Palestine (articles 3 and 2I),
- Any solution not based on tle right to total lil:eration of ttre corrntry must be
rejected. The objective - the establishrent of an independent statts - canrpt be
achieved by political reans but only by arned ccnbat (articles 9 and 2l),
- The struggle against Israel is legal, but the &fence of Israeli interests is
illegal (article 18).
the PI,C) therefore condemns the existence of the state of Israel, whose
establishment it regards as ilIegal, and seeks the establishnent of an indepen&nt
Palestinian state througlr amed revolutionaty reans.
the PI,o
30. Under the leadership of !',lr Yasser Arafat the PU) has succeeded in gaining
international rec-ognition, with its orrn representatives in npre than fifty states.
In (IrLol'xtr 1974 thc Arab Sumit Conferc'rx'<: at Ral)at rcctxlni.sed ttxe Pm as thc rcIe
representati'ue of the Balestinians. 'Ihen in No!'enil)er 1979 Mr /\rafat was invited to
address the 29th session of the UN @ncral jLssertrly and was guaranteed the status of
official UN obsenrer. Since then Ivlr ArafaL has gone fron trirlph to diplcrratic
triunph. He has been received by the forrrer Spanish Prjrre Minister, th. Adolfo
Sttarez .rnd by the Austrian Chancellor, Mr Brurm lkeisky. 'lhe Greek governncnt has
offcred dilrl<rnatic status t() .1 PII) rLiprescntati<xr in Atlrcns.
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3I. Consegtrentlr, ,."ana years harre seen the adoption of a npre npderate stance
by sone elenents within the PLn, nhich have shorm a readiness to accept ccrtain
crcnpronises and a greater interest. in intensifying contacts with non-Arab
organisations such as the EUropean Ccnnrrrnities. In 1974 the PIO announced that it
r'ould be ready to found a Palestinian state in any part of the territory of the
Palestinian l4andate. In Augiust 1980, for exarple, !,lr Arafat I d""t"t"d that the
Palestinians' objectirre was to set up a 'liberal, denpcratic state ql territory
evacuated by Israel in wtrich Moslerns, Jews and Christians could lirre together in
peace'. In Novenrber 1980 he also disrnissed the resolution proposed to the !{ay
1980 Fatah Conference wtrich called for the tiqridation of IsrreI.
Ihe Middle-East
-agg areqlg sgfi-et/_4gp:lqeq,,t"nsiry
32. that the Middle East should have sud&nly becqrc in ttn early 1960's an
area of Soviet-Arerican csrfrontatiql may be consi&red in many ways unavoidable.
After Ehe 1956 Sr.rez Crisis, the defeated Presi&nt Nasser tufned for support to
the Soviet Union, wtrilst the US, arxious to safeguard its security interests in
the area, was for the first tine brought into diplonatic nures tcnards a PeG
settlerrcnt and son established itsel.f as the rnain guarantor of the existence of
Isracl. In addition, Waslrington had to fill the gap left by the United Kingdcrt
and France.
33. The area lies strategically within Ehe field of tension betlren the traditional
spheres of influerrce of the two superporrers, and in vie+r of tlE inportance to both
sides of the oil resources the region possesses, errents in tte countries of the Mj&rre
East have thus cqIE to have a direct bearing on the state of East-{{est relations and
on the general state of d6tente. fn recent ]Ears the united States has succeeded in
retaining the initiative and ccupying a dcrninant position in the area, as evi&nced
in particular tly the expulsion of 10,000 Sovlet ad'rris<rrs fron Eglpt lry president Sadat
and thc active diplonracy of the US Scrret.rry of State, Dr Kissinger, urho initiated a
Preess of rapprehenent in thc form of disengagenent agree(Ents betueen Israel on tlre
one hand and Eglpt and Syria on the other. Ilcr^rever, the Sot/iet Union rqnained alert:
Moscor conclu&d treaties of friendship with Iraq, Syria and the Peoplers Republic of
YerEn, while continuing to bring great political influence to bear ql Darnascus.
The revolution in Iran and the Sorriet invasion of Afghanistan have prcrpted the United
States to detaelop a rRapiC Deplolment Force', troops wtrich can be swiftly ndrilized
within the Middle East shoulci the need arise, particularly for ttre protection of oi]
fields. While such a nrcve is understandable, there is a danger of it provoking a
reaction frcm the Soviet Union, particularty if the prescnce of such a force is
conspicuous through land bases.
34. The l5th Session of the Palestinian National Congress, in mid-furiI 198I has
revealed a strong desire for a closer relationship betueen the PtJ) arnd the Soviet
I Interrie*,ed in Le l4onde
2.
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Union. The Chairrnan of thp palestinian National Council, l,tr Farork Ka&unri,
Iaunclrcd an attack on US policy in the Middle East, &scribing it as an attenFrt toprovoke the plo. He added that it was furportant for the pln to strengthen itsties with 'friendly countries' 
- narrcJ.y the soviet union - and the congress ga\re
a warm ue]crxe to rccrnrade Brezhnev's pr.oposal on t.fu3 Middle llast and the palestinianissue.'
35' This soviet nDve - (placud bnf.;re Lhe ilVr cpsu conferenoe) consisted largeryof a proposal to revive the @neva peace conference, wtrich was convened a" ;;;peace settrsrcnt after the ruab-rsraeli war of rg73, but failed to achieve one.
36' During all this period, the probJern of the proriferation of nuclear Heaponshas bcen sitentry present in the region. An erenent of uncertainey and potentialdanger in the Middre East ries in the extent to r*hich rsrael, rraq and Li-bya aredevcloPillg a ntrclear capabiriLy. Both coturtries harrc u-\-n inpxrrting materials inorder Lo end<rw thernsc.Lves with the possibility of using nuclear energD, for peacefulpurFoses. Blt there ha,e been persistent suggestions in tle Eurcpean press thatthese materials may in tinre be capable of adaptaticn to military r.rse. rf ttresereports are based on'fact, the acg,isition of military ntrcrear capability by tr.ocountries at the heart of the Arab-rsraeli dispute courd alter the balance ofpo'rer in the Middre East and have untold effects on us-sorriet rerations there.
37 ' the rsraeri position is never to be the first to introduce nr.clear heaponsin the region' This ces not discrose the actual state of rsraeli ntrclear ,,eaponstechnology, research and derreropnent. I.rot being a party to the Non-proriferationTreaty and allrurng only irqic'rfer:t rrcrification prrrr.<rures or.l its nwrear insLalr..rticns,Israerrs sta,u:e in r-e<*.,nt events sncrr as .hc raid on ttre- rraqi Tanm'z rerctor isbotrnd t'o be plitical ly 
'rcak. rt rrDurd seem advisable for rsrael to join the lton-I'r:oli'reraLion Trcaty' It slrourd not lx! forgottcn tlut the t,lon-proliferat.ion Treatyhas a withdrawar crause that courd be used by rsraer when ir_s nrrr."a-r"a";";;
at stako.
3. f_hg_ gry_s_t_i.gr 
-of xi@le rhsr, oil
38' The disruptrve effect on oir suppries of a serjes of miritary cpnflicts andthc subsequent potiticar instabirity in the Middre East througlput the 1970,s,tcigcther with thc massive increase in oir prices, has had extrenEry serious
coltscl(luenoes for the industrialised nations of hrestcrn Eur@.
39. The close rcl.rtionship betrreen oil Jnports ancl econcmic Arcrrrth inLIre ,kxrlx'r sLates tpcare incrcasingly crear in tl)e aftem*Lh of tire 1g73 0i1crrses, e,d was one t:f chc p.ne nrcti,es for the q,"ning of the Eure-Arab Diarogr.rcin trrat year. sixt;' t. 708 of Europe's oir inpor:ts currently ccne foqn tl* Arab('otllltrl(rri atl(l tlte 1'rqxrrt iott .t- (!NP tlr.rt l'Irrtlx';r.t <txurLrir.s lrdvrr t. qx.n4 rlr arcir(rIl ur[xJl ts har.: bcvfn c(rtstalL ly rising.
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40. rn vienr of this, the state of Erropean, relalions with the j\rab oir prod:cing
curntries cbnstituteE an irportant ererent in .any consideration of ,the situatiqr inthe !'tiddle Eact, and it is becming increasi,rlgry fuportant that, in orfu to
nitigate. the ecrcnic effects of the oil price policies of OpE, the European
connlrity suForts the prmess of tectunrogrcalr econqnic and seial , nrcdernisaticn
of t-tre Arab oil stat€s and.tteir participation in r+orrd econcrnics. lti@le r.-sg
oil also plays an inportant rrole in ilu cr<lx,my. of the United states {coprising9+lot totar oil inports in 1981)and the so\riet union has shovn a particularinterest in oil frqn tle GrIf States for dsrestic consurytion, preferring to u6e its
orn spplies to earn valu:tle investnent credits..
4. Ttre r.oIF of. the ErrqearlCcrrnlni_ty in_-thgtliddle Easr
a) Ttre Erro-Arab Dialogrue
41. As re have seen, the 1973 oil crisis sened, drarnatically, to bring horeto the hrropean ca,'r:rr.mity its &pen&nce on the Arab oil states. rn tte safiE l,e.rr,therefore' initial contacts tere estabrished,qr the initiatirre of the Arabs betr+eenthe oil-producj'rrg cofrtries of the Arab Leagr.rc and the cqnnunities, v*rich vere laterfonulised into the Euro-Arab Dialogue. the rnain thenres of this Dialogue are the
ecorunic and indrstriat &velogrcnt r)f the ojl-e4rorE.ing comtriesr guaranteed
energy supplies for ttc Gonn'urity countries and the joint financing of develq*ntprojects in the Ttrird t{orld Arab nations.
42' Lt''LrrLt.tl l'9?5 
'lrl lj'lll rli:*'ttri:litll1i r.r'rr' lx.l,rl rrr ;rr.irrr iLy ,rtrirlcrrr.; irr tlrr-. I it ltlof agriculture, indrstrialisation, tra&, finane and scientific a:.d technical
coQeration' TtE Arab side tried also to raise Poriticar aspecte. Forlcning tte
signature of the Tleaty of Feace betr*een eypt and Israel in l,tarch 1979, the Dialogue
was zuspended' An eventual rer4:ening of tlre d.iscussiorrs wilr raise tte guestion ofthe status of the ptD.
b) Evsrr.e_-qssl.er.pllgl
{3' since 1973 in partic'urar.the cormtrnity r.lenber states,harre also been actiug
concernivrg the Middre East on the lever of poritical cooperation. A good start
was made with the Dcclaration of Norrcnber 6, lg73 in urtrich a, breakthrough was
realised comrning the cc."inition of the palestinian problem. A quite renrarkable
speech was nade by the presi&nt-in-office of the council, r,rr o,IGnnedy, at the
t nited t{ations @rcral Assenrery on 25 septer$e r 1979, [b 
.enunciated the principresqn ufiieh a settlqEnt mrst be based. Ttrese prirrcipres are as follcns:
(i) I,rc inadnissibility of Urc acc;uisiLior.r 
.[ tcrritory by force(ii) the rEed for rsraer to,end lhe territoriar occupatiqr wtrich it has rnaintained
since t}e conflict oE 196?(iii) Respecc for tlre sovereignty, territorial integrity and independencc of every
staLc in Lrrc area and their right to live in peace within secure and
rec.ogn i sed borrndaries(iv) necognition that in the eshbrisfuent of a just and rasting peace account. must[p taken of ttn lcaiti,nate riglrts of the p.rlestinians.
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44. At the rrEeting oi tf- Arcpean Corrcil in \,et|ioe in JLEb l98O; the Heads of
Goverruent and the t{inisters of &reiEn Affaire 6f ttE Nl.ne hetd a oonpretiensirre
etcharqe of viens or all aspects of the preFont cituatiql in tho lrtiddle Faqt. ttrey
agreed that grcnlng tcnsidrs affecting tlE fegiq cinstituted a seriqJs danger ard
rendered a ofiprelencive colrrtisr to ttn ArS-IrraIi oqrflict'',n:xe neceisary ana
pressing ttrarr encr.' Easing itlclf cr Sacurity'Carbil Resolutiarg 242 and 338,
tjte E\rqean Cqr,EiI egreescd aare.rn an fqrr najrr point-s in its venice *Iaratiqr
of 13 June 1980 -
i
- The endirg of the territorial wtpation,
- Self-detcrminatim for the Palestinian peqlel
- Security in tlE tli.&le East,.
- The status of Janrsalem. I
Further, it cnurrciatnd iir triusl.l priiwiples nni\rersatly acrclted by ttE
internaticral cmmity; -
''- the right to erd€terEe trd to ses$ity of all the statcs in the rerlian,
includirg Isrel, ard
- Justice for aII tne'peples 6ich inpties ttc recogrnition of tte'Iegitimate
rights of tle palegtinian pecple. r -
45. rtE Nine declared tlrat thqr rere prcparcd to parttcipate 'wittrin the
fratenprk of a cotprehenalvg settl@nt in a cy,gtenr of cqrcreta and binding
internatiqral gurantee, including guarant€es ar the grund' ard tlcy refused
all unilateral initiatince utEB€ pfifJgso,uAB to change ttE status of Israel. Ihe
Palestinian peqre and the pto shqrrd be asseiated with the peae rpgotiatios.
c) Ttp lfj.gsicrs of t€gsrs. cltrofn and Van dcr Klaauvr
- 
rr!. !
{6. the Cd.ucl1 Presi&nts rcspd'leible, Itlessrs. Ttrorn and Van &r Klaauw under-
tcr* corttact nissitrrs in Uro xrrnrl lrrlf',rl' lg80 an<l thc firs! lraJf of 1.98I, rcspectivcly.
I'lr van &r Klaaud qerated qr the basis of a r"orking drcurcnt, that represented a
broad consensus arcng cqrnunity Foretgn ltinist:rs. It was designed as an internal
report setting olrt oPtiqls for dircussiqr rather than any final plan for peace.
According t&. presa r€ports the rcrkirg drc1pnt oorrered the four main points of the
Venice Declaration :
- I sriu'l i rn i thdrirrr.l I
- Palestinian s@1f-determin*ifi
- Security guarantees for all Etates in the rcgion
- Jerusalqr
the ajms especially of the van &r Klaarrn mission, sffi to have been to
atteflpt to stirn'llate tlle diffcrcnt states arrd p<pte in thc region themsclves tg get
tnyglvcd _{r_discussions, and Later lE$rtiatiors, anrl that Arrq:ean interlautors
I c'or full tc:tt Eee AruEr 4
\,
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sfpuld gradually fade away in the background.
47. Fotloring a meeting with ttlr Van der Klaauw in Damascus, the PLO teader,
Mr Yasser Arafat, insisted that a European initiative must take futL
account of PaIestinians'rights. Mr Arafat refused to make any statement
vhich did not chattenge Israel's right to existence. In mid-ApriL 1981,
the 15th session of the Palestinian NationaI CounciL confirmed the geniraI
hostitity to any European initiative, especiaLLy since President Sadatrs
address to the European Partiantnt in February.
Israeli Reaction'
48. The meeting with ttlr Arafat prompted immecijate criticism from the Israeti
Foreign Minister, Mr Yitzhak Shamir, who on 16 ApliL 1fl31, strsgLy.".dr,r,.d
the activities of the Ten in the ttliddle East. The Minister strongLy attacked
Europets "pro-PaIestinian" stand, uhich advocated "sotutions rhich cou[d
onty Lead to the totat etimination of IsraeL", and encouraged the PLO.
49. Ttle Errropean Council in Jurrc I98l conctudcd that the Ten should continue
'energetically and without rcsl.lite' their efforts to prcnote a peaccful settlefiEnt.
Ministers !€rs instrLrcted to elaborate furthcr the practical possibilities available
to Europe to this end by internal reflection, utrile rnaintaining appropriate contacts
with all parties concerned, including the United States. Ttre reference to con-
sultations with the USA tpuld appear to indicate that ttle Eurcpean Council has
accorded an added fuportance to the Canp David Agre€lrents. I'Ie have referred
elsewtpre to the Participation of 4 l'ledler Stat€s in tle Sinai peace-keeping
Force.
d) Euasrs or_a--fg.t_r15.9.._c9gqyp.I_r_y. .i!f.agy
50. Tte Er:rope of the Ten has an obvious interest in pronroting a settlerpnt in
the Middle East, a-d it is clear that the European Par]iaflEnt. can and nust no^,
adopt a cordinated strategy for action in thc Midd1e East covering all the main
problems and crisis points in the arca, and based on United Nations Security
Council Resolutiqrs 242 and 338.
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51. In view of tttis nrgean policy sttould be to &velq> i&ao tIEt nr1 parallel
and not cpntrary to ttE peace prcess that has been started at Carp David. It is
necessary, then, that a rcw Errqean initiatirrc bc presented - rtr. as an alternatine
which might urermire d.y t S nediatory role in tle dispute, hlt as a series of
curdinated actiqrs and cqlarentary policies &rrclqed within tlre franrrrork of
greater cstsultatiqr ard @rdinatisr of efforts Ite 1ten slurld, tJerefore,
qrtinue to consult tlE USA, the Arab Stat-es, the PIO, ottpr Palestinian representatirns,
and Israel and to infotm ttE tD.l abort future prqoeals for a peaoe *ttl€r€nt.
Tte Palestinian Is$E and the PIO
52. In particular ttn Erqean Cornrnity must erphasise the rEed to draft
soltE ncu, suggestions on tln qucstion of t'.rl<.r-tinian rclf-tbtcrmination and
autonsfl)r, ard m the prticipatrql of t}le Palestinian people, the PtO and ttE othei
Arab States in tlE negotiating prcess airning at an o\reraU settlsrEnt of tlc alisFnrter
arqean policiee rnrst eqlnlly serve to clarify ere basic qrrsticns qr the poeiticr
of the Plo in a future pec plan. rt stpuld be clear tllat the rten cannot
recognize tlE PfO as tle sole reprresentatirre of the Palestinian pecple. Ttte
Palestinians tlrenrseltrcs are trblo to rh'itlc tly rrtrtm tlrcy wish to be rqxesented.
Ihe PIO is nevertJreless an fuportant factor in the preessing of a peace scttl.enEnt.
Its irlxlrtarc 6ould be e.'*ranced if the ltn rrere to oea€e acts of terroriEm ard to
repeal ttpse sectiqrs of the PIO Covenant utrich ttrreaten the eJdstence of Israel.
53. 'Ite esseEtial elmnt in ttre wtrole prdlsn rcrrld be for Israel and the palestinian
3s1rlr:, incluling tln l![r), to hr]rl l.rll,.:: witlr r..x'lr otlx.r'tuxl to irrjt iatc i.r qr.r<tual
pt@ess leading to mrtual acEep,tance and reoogniticr. It will be clear that the
Israeli settlqrent policy and the Srcstion of Jenrsalsn sill be rn:ry trard nuts to
crack. one stptttd not nrle otrt options *rich foresee a total or partial internatiorralisatiqr
of Jerusalanr.
se"urig_-gglrargg
54. Seq-lrity is of vital irq,nrtarre for aLI stat€s in ttr6 negion, br"rt especially
for the State of Israel. Withont c-onvirrcing security arrarEerrnts Israel will rarer
agree to any soluticr of the ,luab-Israeli cpnflict. Onc"e again, in this @rrterc, orE
has to underlirxr thc par,rrrDunt irfnrtarrx! of thc [ba-re Treaty of 1979 betrcen Egllpt
and Israel. On a practical lerrcI, the role of the hrrqean Conurnity aouJ.d irrclude,
together with tle trSA and the tht, the irrpl@ntation of various military trEasr.lres.
For instancc, ilcntership of u{ pea<e-kc.eping forces and the rainterunce of &-
tttilitarized soncs. In proposing this, orrc strould never lose sight of the fact that
peace in f,,hq Mid,rls East is of prirrc irq,rrtance for rsrrel1 but t}tat real trard
security guarantees can orly be proviN by the Unitcd States.
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55. Ttre Errrqean cmnrnity oofld help very fnritfurry on egrcrdc, fharciar
and technical levels. It 6[d rer&r assistarre of this t]pe to Israel, to the
Palestinian people and to otlEr states uho are willing to cocperate. A valuable
stePPing stone in this regard was provi&d ttE resolution passed by the nrrqean
Parrianent on 25 Aprir 1979, on the easiqr of ttc sigring of tlc frypt-rsrel
peace $.eaty. In this resolutiql the Corncil and Conissiqr are called t+on to
intersify existing links betreen ttc arrqean cqm.rnities, Eglpt and rsraer, and
to offer strqlger coqeration to ttpse states of tte area r.*rictr are willing
to participate in the Pr@ess of achieving a oorpnelrensive pere settleflEnt.
56. rhe Ccnntission is also instructed to snhnit oqtcrete prqosals to ircrease
inAEtrial coqeratian betrreen the Ccnnunit.ies and Israel and betrcen the Ccnrnurities
and E$pt as a qrtributiql to a derrelcpnent of the regior, and the Report irrchr&s
suggestions for +ecifie projects in ordcr to irrcreasc the indrstrial capacity of
both oountries to dirrcrsily tlx-.ir qr:rxrnics.
L cqretrensilre settlsment
57- It mlst be clear that a corprehensit/e aet,tlement and a durable and lasting
lErce can be acttie\red eventually only ry bringing in tte Soviet t nion. Itrat oqrld
be &ne by &afting, in tte final stages a follqrup resolutiql to Security C61ryEiI
&solution 242. rhat rrt, resolution stpuld nake erglicit reference to ttre Stat€
of rsrael and to the right to self-determination of the palestinian people.
PI\RT II I,ETIA,I.IOI.I
t. Brief history-:!-telglrg!
58. Ntlrcugh I€banon was part of the cJttqnan Erpire, its popuration was
predoninantly Christian. The renolvn of the Lebanese as surccessful nerchants
extended far bepnd its bor&rs. tebanon was tte place wtrere the Arab States rEt
the rest of the uor1d.
59. During ttp anrEd conflicts at the end of Sbrld War f, t}e Trrrkish trocps
rere driven out by the Frerrch and British, in scnE cases with Arab srryport. rn
1925 Lebanon was placed wder tuench adninistration and was thereby officially
separated fron Syria for the first tine in its history.
60. In 1943 Lebanon achietred independence as tle ReErblic of Lebanon. Under the
threat of a general strike in l{orrenber 1943, all saial sectors subscri-bed to a
cqronise knonm as the 'National Agrcrerent' rrrhich provi&d for official posts
(and conseguently the three highest offices of state) to be alleated to the l,lrrslenr
and Christian ccmnr.rnities in a ratio of 5:5; this ratio was based on the results
of the 1932 census- Thc agreenent contairrcd trutual conessions: the l&slenrs
rerrcunoed union with Syria - i.e. irrcorporatiqr in an enlarged lrrab qrmurity 
- ard
tje Christians accepted a Lebanese state 'h,ith an Arab facrer not protected by
Etance.
-B- pe zg.toe fin.
61.
(r)
(2t
The ayrecnent wa-s hrsrrl on tho foLlc*rin<y prirciples:
Iebarrcn is an indepen&nt sovereign stat€ qr an equal foting with arl the
otter rorld states.
t€barpn is the cc:mDn npther cqmtry of arl f.ebanese, irrespective of tle
existence of nurcrors rel igiorrs gr(r,ll)si. E\rery Lebanesc has the right to
hold pblic office, the sore resenration concerning tJre nunbr of offies
allaated to each &ncnrinatiqr.
I€banon is an Arab State, a rErnber of the great AraI: family. It therefore
cooPerates h,ith all ,\ral) Stat€rs altlxrrqh it <Lr-.s not. entcr into alliarrces with
ttsn or subjugatc itsL'tf to thou.
62- fhis agreerent still constitutcs the fourdations of the t€barpse State
today; for several decades it was thc basis for a peac.eful partnership betr.pen
the various religious groups and enabted the political institutions to firrrctiqr
efficiently
63. The constitution of the state of Israel led to an influx of pal.estinians,
nostly bslem, refrrgees into Lebanon. ltp battles for Jordanian territory and
.Jordan's sPulsion of the Palestinians in 1969 and 1970 ted to a firrther overall
increase in the mJ[&er of !.loslems in Lebanon. Ttre refugees are not recognized
as Lebarese citizens but they expressly support the demand nrade by tlc l,loslenr
Lebanese that they should have a greaLer say in plitical life. Ttre justification
for this dernand is that the nwber of ltlcslems has increased oonstantly since the
1932 census, and that the 1943 National Agree.nent, urtrich governs the all@ation ofpolitical offices, should nor.r be revised because at present tlre najority of tlre
population is l'loslenr - a dernand wtrich is categorically rejected by tte ltaronites
and other Christians.
64. Ttle causes of the conflict wtrich has ireen seething in Lebarrcn for a deca&
lie partly in the serri-feudal structures of the saial system, rrfiich contrast
sharpry h,ith the urtra-no<lern dsrpcratic forms; parEry in thc inabirity of the
governrEnt to nediate in the confrict betr,Een the rerigious groups, and partty in
the seraere internal and external pressures affecting Lebanon because of the palestinian
problern.
65. Ttre conflict has rnanifested itserf in a continuirg civir war, no, active,
ncrw passive, betr.een arned elenents of the contending religious grorps. In south
Lebranon rnainly to lawrch attacks on neigtrbouring rsraeli territory; these in turn
provoke arned reprisals by land and air by ttrc Israelis. The r\rab Deterr€nt Forc€(ADF) of syrian soldiers intervened in Lebanon originally to rinit ttE arrrEdhostilities betr,een christians and !,bsrems, to gi\re sqre advantage to the latter.
Ho'€ver, in April 1981 syrian sAltl-nissiles of soviet origin rere for the first tinc
usec against Christian ccrnnunities in zalrle, in south-cast Lebarrcn. rhis actiirn
provoked Israeli air raids aga.inst the Syrian missile units, thus fnrther aggravating
the already tense situation.
(3)
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Intensirre negotiations, directod by the ruerican un&r secretary of state,llr Phirip Habib, brorght abort a fragile cease-fire wtrich has rsnaircd fragile becarse
the rnissires have stilr not been rgrpved frcnr the Bekaa-varrey. A positite
&trclqrent nas lsrerrer that for the first tirrE indirect conte-ts harle been establigtred
beB€en the State of Isrel and the pLO.
l6in pcrrcr g,-or.ps
66- rhe main social fores h r.?harron are the crhristians, tln r.rosreng, the
Parestinj.ans and the syrians. th" ct=i+i.n sector of t}le pqrtratiql cqrsists of
ljlaronites, Greek-ftho&:< christians and Greek cat}ol.ics rreunited with Rcrlg andis l€stern oriented. Ttre lbetEns belcrg to the sunnites, the shirit€s and the
DEuzes, all of trrtrich r*'uld like to se Lcbanorr integrated intc the Arab mrtd. ItEreis also a rninority Jaish grotq>.
67 ' the third large population grorp crxrsists of appro:<irnately 4001000 palestinians,
of r*trorr, sc.ne 10,000 are arned. l6st of the pa.l.estinians are lrbslettE, i.e., tleir
integration into the political systern rurld strengthe,r the !{ctem peuldion and
exacerbate the conflict betrcen Christians irnd [bslsns over tlte alleation of polit{crlpol.r. Many Parestinians are fonrer ref'geos uho fred to Iebanorr aftcr the
oqrstitution of the state of rsraer in 1948. Ttre politicar nurt@ieoe of tl,re parestinian8is the Palestine Liberatiqt organisation (PIo) ertrich was foun&d in l9G4 arrd hasits headquarters in Beinrt. rhe Pto claims that the 1969 cato Agre€flEnt grants tlE
Palestinians tlre right to resi& in Souttern tcbanon.
68. Ttris agreement r.ras signed by representatives of the Lebarpn, Egpt and t],,e plrt,
at the instigation of president Nasser; it governs relations betreen the lebarese
state and the Parestinians. rher terns of the agre€rEnt are regar&d as a victoryfor the Parestinians living in Lebarsr, who rere granted the right to take parl in
the (arred) Palestinian revolution provi&d that they agreed to restEct the prirciples
of t'ebanese sovereigrnty and security. rn practice the palestinians rrEre gnanted the
right to wage their liberation strtrggre fron bases on Lebanese territory.
69 ' Alncst aII the 9-y-nans in lebanon are soldiers of the Arab Det€rrent Etorce -
scnre 30,000 strong and put together after the civil war of 1975/76 - vltp rere the
determining factor in the battles in Beirut against the christian nititia. Iteir
Presence has been in the past, and at scrE tiles, usefur in gruaranteeing to sqrE
extent peacefur co-existence betr,reen tle easern (christian) and rrestern (r,loslgn)
halves of the Lebanese capital.
.tgtjtic_t_gr"rrp:
70' There are sc:ne 20 different political parties in tebarpn wtrich cover tlre
entire politicat spectn[n. Ttrey do not, houever, e:(ert any determining inflrnnce crpolitical life, wtrich is 
.governed mainly by the religious grci.lps.
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7I. Ite Costitutiqr (first draft of 1926) lays dcHn that ttn Presi&rt d the
Repdclic mrst be a I'laronite, tlp Prcrrier a $rnnite tbslqil and the Presi&rt of tlp
chater a shi'ite. Ecctrtive porer is ecrcised by the chanber ntrich has 53
Ctuigtian and 45 l,bsl€tn ttcnters.
72. At present the follotrirg coalitifis erdst in tlE Par[gllE[rt: tJle right*irg
(Ctuistian) grdP (with an orrcrutnLnirg mjorlty of tlaranites) eansists 6f rrlarnegc
phalanqiEta (AI xataeb) and ttE t{atimal Liberat Party (PNL), rrlr sr.port a dlvislsr
of rebarsr into christian and lbelen parts. rirere is a {Ircirp of mall left*ing
parties - the Progessive Social.ist Party (P{P), tjre lebarese Cmnlrist party (FCt),
ttttich previansly shared a conuql party sccr.ltive cqnnittee with grria; it g;1ports
the PII) ard is tlc crly par-y wtEre rrErDershlp of a reIigiors gra€ is rd, a
fdor - it is rmulti-&rsninatiqral' togettpr with tne organization fc Cqru11ist
kEiqt ln lcbarrcn (Orc) they form the l{atiqul Progressirre }bremnt. In additisr,
tlere is ttn inaepenent l{asserite lpvmnt r*trictr sees iteelf as the runicn of
tEdng Dqlers Et)rcer and tuo Syrian-inflrrrrced nE\rEtrEnts rrtridr play rD rErre
than a rnirpr role in parlircntary rtivities (ttE llatina] Syrfur Socialist
narty) (PSNS) and ttp National Spian parry (pt{S)
2. Special situation in Sqrtjt l€barpn
73. ftn oopretensive nature of the Arab-Israeli oarflict is met clearly
AtErrstrat€d in sorttcrn lebarst. In this area Palestinian grnrrillas confrqrt the
militia units of the Cristian lebarese ilajor Saad lladdad, leho has Eet rp his cnn
state (In&pen&nt Flee lebarst) qr a 700 sq. lan. etrip alctg the Isreli-Iebarnse
frsttier. Ihe area is also a target for Israeli att*ks an Palestinian bases hhictl
have resulted in a large nu&er of &ad and hqrt&d ffiig the civilian p6p111atlon
,of 
santtern lebarpn.
71. rsrael receives arnrs .frqn the USA for the rnilitary prctection of itE erdstsEe.
ltp Carter Adninistration apealed unsrressfully to the Israell prtne ltiniEter 14r Eegin
rct to use these l€aPons for Israeli inten enti$s in internat tdanese cqrflicts.
?5. ttp Lcbanese cp\rernttEnt is porerless to int€rt€ne in the oonflict. Its trn
arny nuters barely 6,000 soldiers anil its ccrsat effectiveness is llnited because
of religiors divisions; ccrseqr.cntly it is unable to prerrent tlE omflicts in ttria
area. In view of this situatiqr, the tcbanese Goverrrent ryeated to the (N Securlty
@rncil to statiql tN troes in the oobat zae.
J. uN interrrcntion in thc l€b.upse C<nflict
76. As a result of syrian int€nention in Lebanon, the failure of ttc tDF,
ircreased Isr*Ii attacks and retaliatory strikes in southern tebarnn, t11e t nited
Naticils Security Council deciH in resolutions t{os. 425 and 426 of, 16 l4arch I9ZE
to station a tlN forcc in the cdrbat zone (United Nations Interi.n Ebrce in lebarsr -
T'NIFIL).
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77. INIFILTs task rns set drt in resolutiori tlo. "425 as follors:
i ".
1. Israeli trqs shoJld be r€quired to withbrar from all lebarese territory.
2. Iebanonrs territorial integrity arrd peace in this area shdrfd be restsed
3. lte @verrrent of IAanon slurld're assisted in its efforts to restore its ). .
effec{ive authority in the area.
?8. lf,.l Resotutiqrs tlcs. 421 /18, 434/78, $6n8, 444/79 and 450fi9 also capern the
situation in Lcbanon: tlEy erterded UNIFIL's'tiEndatb on eeveral ccasiqts, increased
the contingent to a nraxinurn of 61000 nEn, strqlgly criticized Isreli attacks on '
Idanese territory, called an tlE Israeli Gorrcrrmnt t6 vritjrdrarp its trocps frqn the
cqr&at zotre: called m ttE unrring factiqrs to 6llc*r tle Internatidtal'M Cro53
to have acqess to tjte rpun&d, eften&d LNIFIL's nandate so that it oculd act as a
nititary unit, granting it tln right to ait in self-&fence, and called at the
I€banese C€rrermEnt to draw r.p a progr.fire setting'crt tjle cqrcrete neasurtss it elld
take to restore its authoritY. 
-'
79. ltn follcr,ring lGfiber States of the Eurqran Conrunity rere and,/or are
involved in IINIFIL: France, Italy, lletherland and lreland. Ihe LrN trocPs are :
only lightly arned and harrc been attacked on several Gcasir,ns by Israeli troq)s,
by the Palestinians and by the Ctuistian militias. LNIFIL ie stationed touth of the .
Litani rirrer and rprth of lfajor ttaddadrs region (Free tcbanon). Its task is na& twe
difficult by the urnrillingness of tle warring factiqrs to qerate. It is stpported
only by ttE poprless Iebanese Go\rerment,
4. Statenents made by thg ElfoPean.Cqurcil and Poreign 4inisters
80. At the hrropean Canncil in Venioe in June 1980, the Nine l€n&er States stressed
the rEed to take inned,iate measures to restore peace in Lcbanon atid therehy to .,
cqrtribute at the src tir€ to defirsing the situatiqr in the nhole of the t4iddle
East. fhey enphasized the fuportant task derrolving on tf,lIFIL and recalled tteir
&Iaration of 22 April 1980 setting qrt LJNIFIL'S tasks: it was to oqrtrol the
territory within the internationally recognlzed frontiers in southern l€batton. Ihe
Elrqean Co.rrrcil neeting at !4aastricht in t{arch 198I, ttnderlined the support given
by the ltcn to UI{IFIL and called on other nations to & likewise.
5. ltissions ol llr Ttorn and !.lr van &r Klaauur
81. Follcwing the Err<pean Council's &claration at Venice on Ure Middle East,
the Presi&nt in office of the Council, !t lIloRN, un&rtok a clntacc mission to
tte ltiddle East, visitiyrg lebarrcn, Syria, Jordan,'Iraq, Saudi-Arabia and EglPt.
In his talks with Dlr !hom, the Lebanese Presidentr !,lr Sarkis (l,larqrite), stressd
Llrat in his virrv the jrrrlrt<urs ftx'cd by Lohrnirn'iust- bn <rnr+idire<l tpttc separatcly
fron the orrerall problenrs facing ttc Middle East:'lilr Thornrs suocessor, l.lr van &r KtAAlIir,
un&rtook a follcn-up nissiqr in the first half of 1981. Nter his visit to l€bancn,
he statd.that at pres€nt the i&a of an international peace-keeping force there
scened ilprac{icablc.
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82. o,t 10 April 1981 the nrcpean Parllalrcnt adryt€d a resolutiorl or lebarur,
calling for an innediate ceasefire, the cessatiqt of the Syrian bonbardtent, tlc
withdrawal of all ortside foroes exoef IilIFIL, and UE re-establis]nent of the
authority of the I€barEse qro\reJrrcnt. A further resotution of 22 ApriL 1982 requested the
PaLestiry2 Liberation Movement to recogni& the sovereignty of the Lebanese
Government, cal[ed for free electiorsin Lebanoh and insisted that atI foreign armed
forces be withdrawn.
6. EEC-Lebanon
83. The European Communityrs Cooperation Agreement uith Lebanon uras
signed in 1977 and entered lnto force on 1 Novenber 1978. It is of
indefinite duration and provides for entry free of duty or quantitative
restriction into the EC for nost lndustriaI products and rau rnateriats.
PreferentiaI access ls atso granted for lrnports of agricutturat products.
A financial Protocol to the agreement made avaitabte a totat of
30 miil.ien EUA in the period ending 31 0ctober 1981. Some projects are
stil.t being financed in the Lebanon nith funds made avaitabte unCer thlsPrctocol. In common uith other l,laghreb and &lashreq countries, the
Lebanon has atso recentty conctuded negotiations for a second Financiat
Protocot, under vhich over 5 years 50 miLtion ECUs ult[ be made
avaitabte (16 mi[[ion froro the EC's budgetary "oun resources" and
34 miLtion in EIB toans). The signature of thls Protocol is expected
to take ptace shortty.
As regards food aid, the 1981 Community prograri:me prcvideC tor
direct aid of 101000 tonnesof cereatsr 11100 tonnes of skimrned mitk
powder and 1000 tonnes of butter-oiI for Lebanon. Under the 1982
Coi;rnunity programme, it ls ptanned to send aid of ?01000 tonnes of
cereaIs, 11100 tonnes of skir,rmeC miLk powder and 100C tci:nes of b.riier-
oi L. In addition, srnatt quantities of skinrned mi Lk po:.rCer and buiter-
oiL uere sent through non-governmentat organisations in 193i and more
arc proposed for 1982. Emergency aid of 94.OOO tonnes of skimr:red mitk
por,rcler is.being sent through the InternationaI Cornmittee of the Red
Cross to Lebanon.
F\.lture Course
84.I)r.J[JosalsbytheuurolxranParliarrcntoatebanonshculdtakeaccountoftlre
follov.ring factors:
(a) 1,r9-l-iel}-"!Ir!g]e.S--P.r.oP-19!l
A soluti.on of the lebarron pro'blem must be sotqht inclependent'Iy of a 
solution
ofthcArab.Israelidispute,throughasolutronoEthelatteruouldgreatllassist
thesettlerEntoftheforrrer.Itseemsadvisabletoworkinthedirectionofthe
witlidra'..ral or disengagetrcnt of as many as possible of foreign arned forces 
(UNIEIL
excLrrded) frcm I.cbanon' Thcsc forces slrould in sorre vital areas be substitut'ed 
by
UNlr.rt:ekeepingforccs.Tlrisrnouldcreateroortforrebuildingandreconstructing
tln'ln'l rtrt()rr, irx-luclirrq a rclnl-()graLiorl of tla<1dad's entity in the country' Olle
t't,uId .r['rl :;L.tt t f lx'll \''ltll t ltt' lt'lrttt ltlttt'; ol l'r't r'ttr" t"ttttrrl lotr'r"; 'lll(l lrrl lr-o'
1 . Ttle-
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(b) V,lithdrawal of Israeli and palestinian units
The repe'ated calls.for thc' withdrawal of rsraeli and p.rlcs;t.inian trnits
Ir.rvr: II'err urr',Lruccs:,r(rr.. Lc,rrd'{ru.rtl()ns of Israeli attacks by urc tJN sc,curity
Cotutcil have been ineffective so far. In talks $rith the pIO, the palestinians
should be asked to negotrate an agreenpnt with the Lebanese Governnent wtrich
tnould give them the right - at least untir a lasting settlsrEnt of the palest,inian
problcm was achievcd 
- to renain in a gecryraJrhically t^err-derineatcd rl.rca of
Soutlrcrn lcbanon (lr>r exanqrle, the 1)rre area). Anred actions by the palestrnians
should cqne to an end because other*rise rsrael wirr not agree on stopping reprisars
and prer,'entive strikes.
(c)
-Q{p!i_!qt_i_o-1_ol_.lP-l.!ly_!lN..I,9IJ'.,:.i.n.tri.Iy!
To redrce tension in Beinrt and restore that city's position as a tradinrg
centre, tie I€banese Governrent slurld be asked to negoti&e a troop withdramf
with Syria. ftris will not be easy since the Syrians & nd regard tlgnselves as
ccrpying forces but as rrErters of tlc IDE. A tD.l force urld then replace t.tre
Syrians to guarantee the truce in Beinrt.
(d) [tr{IFIL's role
ftre nuuerors con&rnatiqrs of attacks on Uf troes Uy both Isreli'and
Palestinian units have been fruitless rb far. lte D.uqean Parll,aEnt shqrld call
qr the tN Security Council to set out afresh the dutiea and rights of UNIFIL and
give Lhc uN [orces greaLcr rqrn lirr nnmr\rvnt. 'llris miglrt bc aclricrred, for enaqcle,
by increasing the size of the contingent. t\rrthernpre,.FntnrEnt oqrsultaticn
groups consisting of officers of the UN troops and the leaders of the other warring
factisrs should be set up in or&r to achieve bett€r coqeration. ltE Palestinians
cqrld be indrced to agree to this suggestior if it rcre pointed cut tlat tleir refusal
would lead to a withdrawal of the t N troes - a m]\,e which w<ruId result in a seriotrs
aggr.rvation of tle situatist in Sorth tebanqr.
lGjor Haddadrs trops could be persrra&d to agree if it rere pointed o.rt
that a:.y refusal to cooperate would firstly lead to a witMrawal of UIfIFIL troops
and *ould cut out possibilities for an eventual gradual reintegratiorr of Hadd.ed's
entity in the lcb.rnon.
(e) Corrunity support for L€banon
'Ihe Eurcpean Connunity slrotrld again inform lebalrcn that it is ready to
provide technical and material assistance stpuld the Iebanese Governnent so
reguest. The l,ebanese C;c\rcrraillt should thercfore be asked to draw rp a detailed
Prografirre illwrtrating the extent to drich emergency hurunitarian aid could assist
in the restoratiqr of its authority. In this cqlter(t, the prdlanr of rehrilding
an effective lebanese army and police fore sirould also be cqrsi&red. ftris r.puld
have to go hand in hand with the dissolving of militias.
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8. Supptementary summary on the Lebanon
8. 1 .- Iscee!lc-lntesyeolte!-!!-teleBs!
The Isracti arny invaded Lcbanon on 6 June 1962. Ihe UI{IFIL troops, as
vas indicated in a report by the united l{ations secretary Generat, coutd not
provL'nt the invasion, as thcy had nclther thc randate nor tho nititary copacity
to counter such a strong attack.(1)
rhc operation rPeace in Gatitee' vas first sald by thc Israetis to be
ained at protecting the civitian poputation of 6atitee froe PLo attacks fron
Southern Lebanon. ilevcrthetess, nititary operations soon provcd to be on
a much l,argcr scate, Beirut ras throrn into a statG of sicae and the Israel.i
Government aade it ctear that the ain of the opcration uas to frec Lebanon
fron the PLo.
8.2.- I!e- tnl!!s!-!!!!-trr!!
Syrian forces intervened soon after the invasion gas launched in an
atteopt to halt it. l-arge scate air batttes cnsued and a very large number
of syrian Srtancs vere shot dovn. Israet atso attacled Syrian nissite
batteries (SAtt-6) in the Bokaa Vattey. ileverthctess in an appcat to
the syrian Presirlent, l'lr Hafez at-Assad, thc Israel,i prlne llinister, fi; !6gln
declared to the xnesset tha.t Isract did not rant rar rith Syria.
8' 3'- IIs-gnlred-!etrsns-eod-!!e-grls!!-!n-tcqeoen
0n 5 June 1982, the uN security council, adopted resotution 50E caLting
upon atI parties concerned to stop inncdiatcl,y and simuttaneousty att miLitary
act ivity in I eborron and ;rtong the Israeti-Lebanese border. A second resotution(5o'r) sas,)dopt('(.1 the fottovirrg doy, cal,ting for the innediate and unconditionat
eithdrauat of tho lsracti arned lorces fron Lebanon.
Resotutions 511 and 51?, adoptcd respectivety on lE and 19 June, cal.ted
for a prorogation of the nandate of the UNIFIL and for huraanitarian aid from
the Red Cross and the Rel.ief and tJorks Agency for Patestinian Refugees (UNRtrA).
(1) united Nations Security council,; Report of the secretary Generat srrhmitterlin appl icatron of resotution }Ob (t9EZ) 0f the UniicA-ff.rtlons Security Councit.
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E. 4 
- 
rhe_re!_a0C_!he_teEel9ce-9 r!s!s
0n 9 June 19E2 the llinlstcrs of Foreign Affairs adopted a statenent
in rhich they vigorousty condcrned the ncr Israeti invasion and catted on
Israet to xithdray att its forces irrcdiatety and unconditionatty fron Lebanon
and to grlaco tho ltNlttl irr.r position to acconptish its rnission yithout
h i rrdr,tnt.e -
Ihe Errropean Council of 29 June, in its conctr.rsions on the liiddte East
and Lebanon, naintained the vigorous condetnation of the Israeti invasion.
The Ten atso stated that a finat pcace in Lebanon requircd :
the comptete and prompt uithdravat of tsraeti forces from that country;
the departure of att foreign forces except those authorised by a lcgitimate
and broadty representative Governaent of Lebanon, rhose authority routd be
futty re-establ.ished over att its nationat territory.
The Ten indicated that rlsraet titt not obtain the security to uhich it
has a right by using force and crcating lgltC-esgggplig but it can find this
security by satisfying the Legitinate aspirations of the Patestinian people,
yho.shotr[d have the opportunity to erercise thcir right to setf-dttermination
rith atI that this impties.t The Pt.0 shouLd be associated rith the negotiations.
lho len .rtto corrl irmr.rl thc suspr.nsion
Financiat Protocot rith Israet and decided
meeting of the EtC-Israet Agreenent.
thc signature of the second
suspend the next l{inisteriaL
of
to
The Errropean Par[ianent adopted on 17 June a resotution on the situation
in l.ebanon in rhich it condenrned both the armed action in Lebanon by Israeli
troops, and alt the acts of terrorism against lsrael vhich had preceded it.
The resotution insisted on the uithdnarrat of ait non-Lebancse forces from
Lebanonl and atso'calted on the Coaunission and the Councit of llinisters to
drar rrp immediatety a progranne of aid for the victims of var.
8.s - u0!!ed-ltecesl-dreleoe!is-gs!rv!!x
From the beginning of the crisis thc United States deptoyed considerabte
diptomatic act ivity in order to reach a solrrtion. Prpsident Reogan's speciaI
..1vny, llr I'hrl rp ll.lhth, .rg4rl iort '..lrul I lr.' rli3rlun,rcy rftrritrr; tho crisis, vlsit inq
atternativoty tho crlpilals of Israel, of thc Arab States and atso ol Lebnnon.
itr Habib submitted various peace ptans to the parties, one of vhich ras finatty
adopted by the l.ebanese Governnent, by Israel and by the PLo besieged in llest
Beirut.
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. 6. Ihe-e.vsece!!es-p.!e!
IheptanprovirledfortheevacuationfrornllestB€irutofPLOandSyrian
forces uncter the supervision of ln internationat force, to consist of 800 French'
goo United states.rrrrl 40o Itatian troops. 3ro00 Lcbancse sotdiers lcre to
col Iaborate Yilh lhis lorco'
Ihe Ptan .rtso indicated that :
- non-mititant Palestinians lho lished to tive in Lebanon uoutd be subject to
Lebanese Iegistat ion;
- the nission of the international intervGntion force noutd be concluded
ifoneofthepointsoftheagr?ementhadnotbeenobserved;
- the mandate of the force of one nonth might be extended on request of
the Lebanese Government;
- the evacuation must be conplcted vithin fifteen days'
The agreement
but says that the
Northern Lebanon.
does not specify the utti.ate.destination of the Patestinians,
Syrians ril.t join units of their arrny in the Bekaa VaLtey and
The reqrrest for a prcsence of an internAtional forCc vas announced on
18 August by the Lcbanese Prenier shafiq at-tlazzan, rho said that the cabinet
had made its decision to Seek an internationaI force On the Understanding that
thn ev.rcrr,rl i0rr pl.trr tlr(rrrlrl br.. thr: f irst 'itop lo lhe' imlltnmentatiott ol re-
sotr,r rons 508 and 509 of the Unitcd Nations. Security Councit'
8.7. - Ihe-elg
Durino the tro nonthurrar, the PLO shoued a Strong ritlingness to start
a poL itical, dial,ogua uith thc united states. The PLo President, Itlr Yasser
Arafat, siqned a oapor for a united statcs congressionat group in vhich he
statert his acceptance of att l,nited l{ations resotutions retevant to the
Pal.est inian quest ion-
In an intervier given to the frcnch ncuspapar rLe ilonder on 10 August,
llr Arafat stated th.rt alter the 198? Lebanese uar, the cntire uortd must
deaL Hith the matter at an internationat conference, attended by at't the
counories concerrretl as Yett as by the great povers'
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8.8. - !ce!:Ire9-l,1as
The var betveen lran and lraq started in Septeaber 19g0, rhen Iraq
invaded Iran in order to gain controt of the shatt-aL-Arab uateruay
Leading into the Gutf. Ihe rar adds a dangerous etenent to the conpticated
patterrr of the I'tiddLe East. In tate Juty 19E2, Iranian forces invaded
Southern Iraq. An eventuat defeat of the Iraqi Govcrnnent couLd thrratcn
other governoents in the Gul,f rlth a ner outbreak of Istaaic fundaoentaLisrn.
8.9. - Ile-lcg-urs-secrEs-
Proposats by the European Partiauent on Lebanon shoul.d take account of
the futtoying factors:
{a) so!s3jg-el-!!c-!ebe!e!e-ptgD!9q_ :
.A :iolut iorr of thr' I r.b.rftesr probten nu:,t tre sought inrlependcntty ol
a sotution of the Arab-Israeti dispute, al.though a sol,ution of
the latter routd greatty assist the setttencnt of the forJrer.
The departrrre of the pLO and of syrian troops fron geirut shoutd
represent the first step torafds thc r.ithdrarat of al.l. foreign troops
' fron Lebanon. ro secure such a xithdrarrt, the Ten shoutd consutt
rith the United states on Lebanon and in particutar on the replacenent
of the UNItIL troops by an internationat peace-keeping force under
united Nations auspices; this force voutd be stationed in Beirut and
in other parts of the country. EEC llember States routd participate in
such a force- This voutd create an opportunity for reconstructinE
the Lebanon, inctuding the reintegration of t{ajor Haddad,s entity in
the country itsetf. One coutd atso start then the re-buitding of
Lebanese armed forces and potice, and secure the disbandment of
the miLitias at the sane tine. It is essentiat that the rcconstruction
of the country sh.rrld take into account the eomptex pattern of the
vrrr t()U.i olhnic .lrolrl)s irr orrJor lo ,iat isf y thoir tegit inate oSpirations-
It rs atso vit.rt thar arned action by the non-nititant paLestinians
vho remain in Lebanon shoutd be prevented, as otheryisc Israet might
be pushed to nev reprisats and preventive strikes. One rnight rett
expect that the nerty-etected president of Lebanon, lilr Beshir Gemayet,
uitt seek to devetop poticies atong these tines.
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(b) I!s-ri gldrece!-g!-hses!!s.-srnecs-eod-egosg_Eg!e$iorgrs :
uith the departure of the pLO and the Syrians fron Beirut, Israet has
achieved its nain objective. Israet shoul.d escher pernanent mil.itary
controt of southern Lebanon and shoutd agree to teave Lebanon. The najor
probtem renains of the Syrian and arned plo presence in Lebanon, especiaIty
in the Bekaa valtey. This couLd tead to a ncy conftict betreen Israel
and syria. rhe conrmunity, together rith the united statesrshoutd therefore
direct their diptornatic rndeavours touards a total yithdraual. of att
foreign forces fron Lebanon. rhe vgrious groupings in the Lebanon corrtd
be persuaded to cooe to a generdl agreenent if it uere pointed out that.
any refusat to cooperate routd firstty tead to a rithdrayal. of the inter-
nationat peace-keeping force and sccondty routd cr,iminate any possibitity
of rec';nstructing the country.
lsqqcoily-scopar!_ler_teEe!9! :
The European comrnunity ilust continue supptying huranitarian aid,
particutarty to Lebanon- Atso, the European coanunity shoutd, again
inform Lebanon that it is ready. to provide technicar and natlriat
assistance shoutd the Lebanese Governaent so request. The Lebanese
Governnent shoutd therefore be asked to drav up a detaited prograrnme
Itlustrating the extent to rhich eiergency humanitarian aid coutd
assist in the restoration of its authority.
(c)
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22 Novenbcr 196?
Security Council RcgolutLon 212 (l%Zl
The Securitv Council,
' Expressinq its continuing conccrn with thc arevo situation in
the l.liddle East,
Enphasizinq the inadmiserbrtity ot thc ecqurrrtron of terrltory
by war and the' need to work for a jd t rnd lrrttng p.rc. ln *hlch.cvcrrState in the are! can live in eecurtty,
' 'i 
.
..,..,Emphagizinq f,urther that aII l.tambor Etatar ln
the Charter,of the United Nations hava undcrtekcn a
Ln accordancc with Articlc Z of the chertar,
1. Affims that the fulfirnent of Gharter prrnctplcr 
.gur.r thc
estabrishmcnt. of a just ana' ragting.pcace in thc ltiddle Eart rhieh
shouird inerude the application of both thc folrorlng prnctplcgr . ._ :
(i) rithdrawar of rsrael armed forcee fro torltorica occupicd tn -';:
the recent conflict;
.:(ii) Termination of alr clai.ms of atatcr of bclltgolroncy and rorpccq. 
.for and actouledgpnent of t,he soverclgnty, tarritorial intrgfity fnd.'?'.'politicar independcnce of cvery sEatc in the area end'their right to 
. _.Iive in Peace within secure and reeognizcd boundarhc frce frm thrcatg'
of acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessityl
(a) For guaranteeing freedon of navigation through intcrnational
waterhrays in the areai
(b) For achieving a just seEtrement of thc rcfugcr problcn;
(c) For guaranEeeing thc territoriar inviorabirrty end porittcar
indepcndence of every State in the area, through D.lrur.! lncludlng
the asEablishment of demilitarized zonea, 
,
3' Requests the secretary-GeneraI to deelgnata ! speclal Rcprerentativc
Go proceed to the Middle East to establieh and nelntain contacta with the
states concerned in order to promote agrcenent rnd ecrkt effort! rto
achieve a peaceful and aecepted settrement in eccordanco uith thc pro_
visions and principlea in this resolution;
thclr lcccptanc.
cmttlcnt to..rcB
of.
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4. BggueslEE. the
on the progrese of
poes ible.
Secreta ry-Gencra I
the efforts of the
AUNEX I
to report to the SecuritY Council
Special Representativ€ !a roon as
22 october 1973
Security Council Regolution 338 (1973)
Demand of Cease-['ire in Ehe Middle EasE
t. calls upon alt parties to the Present fighEing to c.ase atl firing
ahd terminate alI military actlvity immcdiatelYr rro later than 12 hours
after t,he rncrnent of the edoPEion of this decision, in the poaltlons
thcy non occuPy; !
2. calls upon. the parties coneerned to start imrnediatcly eft'er'
the eease-!ire the implementation of Security Council rccPlution 2'12
(1967) in all of it's Parts i
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with Ehe ceasc-fire'
nego!iations Sha11 sEarE between the parties concerned under aPpropri'te
auspices aimed ats establishing a just and durable peace ln thc l{iddlc
East.
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Sorne estimates indicate that there havedefining themselves as fedayeen and dedicatedPalestine. Bethreen 1967 and L97? alone, overemerged, aIl extrernely divided and fragrmented.resistance groups are as follons:
olNril 
_2_
TOOO men 
:grouP to the Arab
been as nany as IOO groupB
to the liberation of
30 such organisations
However, the main
Founded in I957 _ Ieader yasser ArafatPolitical spokcsman 
_ Faruq eaddumiThe largest guerilla group _ nurnbering aomeAIso Ehe best known and the most acceptableGoverrunents
The least extremist group, contains both Left and Right wing elementsBased in the Lebanon _ does not bclieve in operations outside theI{iddre East invorving innocent neutrals.
Founded L96?/68 _ leader ceorge HabashThe second largest of the commandoBerieves in resistance haFh r-,.irL:_ :t:uo" - memberehip of about 35oobot within 
r-vsH- o ou
Extremist srouD 
- 
dnh^-h!--r and outside the Middre Eastg p concentrates on 1 
-"v v L ro
operations such :a hi.t-^r-: ban sabotage and on specialr i
:f;"::;::=]u.n as ijackinss and bombinss. Marxist_Leninisrconnect ions 
.
r
Advocates local raEher than remote actiorr
Pounded 1969 from a split in the pFLp 
- Ieader tlayif Hawatmeh
Probably nunbers only a couple of hundred men basedsouthern border with rsrael. strongry pro_Moscow. 
6round Lebanon's
Founded
Has the
Numbers
1968 again
repu Ea t ion
only about
frcrn a split in
of being one of
2OO rnen 
- based
the pFLp 
- leader Ahnad 
.Iibritthe toughest of H
in Lebanon 
guerrilla groups'
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ANNIIX 2
Ye!g-
Founded 1968 by the Syrian Ba'ath Socialist party 
- leader Sanrini Ar:tari
sponsorecl by syrla. Eedayeen <trawrr f rcrrr Pa lestinian rcfrrgr-'e camfrrr i 1
Syria and Lebanon
Seldom mounts any commancio raids.
Arab LiberaEion Front (ALF)
Founded 1959 and sponsored by rraq. Leader AM ar wahhab
aI-Kayyali. The smaIlesE of the resistance groups.
' rn addition the plo mainEains a regurar miritary force knolrn
as.the PalesEinian LiberaEion army (pIA).
Increasingly, the organisation of the palesEinian Resistance
is sprit between the miritants and the moderates. The hard-riners
defend the view that onry force can riberate palestine and that
negoEiatiorrs could never produce more than an unsatisfactory
compromise. others are wirring to-explore Lhe possibirity of a
negoEiated settlemenE and suggest readiness to cqnprqnise boEh on
the extent of a palesEinian state (that is, whether it should include
all the territory west of the River Jor:dan or only on the west Bank
and Gaza) and on the means of achicving it..
_38
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N.INEX 3
- only the Palestlnians can elefun thc righE.of sclf-determination and fullandtotal possession of thc.countty (Arliclec 3 and 2l) ;
- Any soruEion which does not conrlat ln total liberation of the counEry wilrbc rejected; this ain eannot frl rchicvod by political means, butby military means (Articlcr 9 end ll) I
- The struggre againct rarec[ *'rarfur, on the contraryr lny defence
of f eied by Israel ts not (f rtleh. lg) .
TIIE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL -COVENATT
Article I
Palestine is the fatherland of thr 
.hlartlnlrn Arab
an inseparable part of th. grert tfrb f.€hcrlend andpeople form parE of the Areb natlon.
pcople; it constituteg
the Paleetinian
Article 2
Within the frontiers of thG BriEtlh natld.ta, peleetine
terriEorial unit. forme an indivislble
Article 3
The Palestinian Arab people hold r r.sful rlght to their fatherland and
.he right to determine thcir dcstlny aftcr eehievlng the rrberation oftheir country in aceordancc rith therr cn rlshcr and resolve.
Article 4
The palestinian identity ig fundumntlr, orsential and intrinsic; iE isindissolubre and plases frqn fathor to ron. The zionist occupation andEhe dispersar of the parestintan rreb paoplc as q rc'ult of the disastersEhey suffered do not effect or call ln qucrtion thclr palsetinian identityor their membership of the paleatlnlfn caonunity.
Article 5
Palestinians are the Arab eitizcnr sho ucrc living permanenEry in parestineuntir L947 
' 
regardless of whethcr thry heve bacn expelled or are stirl therc.Anyone born of a paleetinian fathcr lftar thrt drte, eiEher in or outsidePalestine, is a palestinian.
Article 6
The Jews who were living permancntly in Felcatine up untlr the beginning ofthe Zionist invasion shall.be conrldercd palestinianc.
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Article 7 ANNEX 3
The fact that there exigts a Palestinian cqnmunity and thrt it has nateriar,spiritual and historicar links wtth:paleeilne is incontrovertible. rt isa national duty to edueate the' individual in line rith thc Arab revorution.Every means must bc enpl0yed to pnovldl e llnk between the pab gEinian andhis country in the furreist lrense, both tprrltusl and naterial. He musE beprepared for armed struggre and the rqcrlfice of.-hie possersions and hislife for the purpose of regaining his fqtherrand and conpleting the riberationof his territory.
ArEicle I
The palestinian Arab people are at Ehis stage fighting for the liberationof Palestine' The contradictions betwe€n th€ pareatinian nationar forceaare therefore secondary and musE be relcaated to the baekground, whereasthe major conflict, Fht beEreen the. zionint ahd ln!,eriarist forces andrhe paresEinian Arab peopre, musr.be rerorved.. on inr" *"i";-;;" pareslinianrnaases in the occupied naEionar fatherrand or in the diaspora (al ma,hdjar)consituEe, boEh as organizationa and as individualsr a Ditlonal front workingfor the redemption of Rarestine and ita liberation through armed struggre.ArEicle 9
Armed sEruggle is the only path to Ehe liberation of paleetine. It istherefore a strategy and not a tactrcar phaae. Tbe palcstinian Arab peopleconfirm Eheir absorute determinatlon,and..fim reaolve to continue theirarmed sEruggle and to,work towardg a ,popurar"armed icvolution for EheIiberation of thei r co.rntry arrd. its rectiEuEion. The lialectinian Arabpeople also reasserE their right to a normal life in paleeEine, the exerciseof their right of self-determination and their souereignty over it.Art icle lO
The parestinian peopre's war of liberation cenEres on action by thecommandos' This must be intensified, extended'r iEs deveropurent safeguardedand the fulr palestinian potential in men,end experlence nust be mobirized;they musE be organized and associat,ed with the amed paregtinian revorution,bringing into play t,tre combined effect dt ttre natlonal atruggte (watani) bythe various groups making up Ehe paresGinra. o;;; ;"pre and the Arab masses(in Arab countries) to ensure rhat the revorution is contin,.red, extendedaltd j s; l- t-iumlrlrarrt
Article Il
Pa les t i nians sha Il uphold three principles:
National union (wataniya), national mobilizatio.n (gaoumia) and liberation.
_tP, 
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ANNEX 3
Article. 12
Thc Parestinian Arab peopre berleve in Arab unity and Arab unification.
They Eherefore betieve that in orddr to achieve thls objecEivc thcy musE,
aE this icage in the national atruggte, safcguard their palegtlnien
identity and all that this entalrg, strengrhen tha awarcncge of their
identiEy and rejecE any scheme llablc to destroy or weaken it.
Artiele 13
Arab union and the liberation of PalegEine are corplementary objectives.
The achievemenE of one of theee objectives shall constiEute a preparagory
etage for Ehe other. Arab union pave! tha way for t,he rlbcratron of
Palestine, and the liberation of parestinc pavea tha way for Arab union.Action to achieve one of thege two objcctivce goca hand in hand with aclion
to achieve the other.
Articto 14
The desEiny of theArab nat,ion and, beyond it, the Arab exiatence itself,
depend on the faEe of the Palestinlen cauae. This link beE\reen theae twodestinies ie the foundation for thc effortg of the Arab nation and its
work tourards the riberation of parestlne. The parestinirn pcopre wirr
maintain its leading role ln Ehe achievement of thls sacred national
objective (gaoumi).
Article 15
Frmr the Arab viewpoint the riberaEion of parestine ie a nationar duty(gaoumi),to drive back the zionist and imperialisl invasion frcnr the
territory of the Arab fatherland and to cleange pale6tin6 of the zionist
existence. The furr responsibirity for this rests on ,th Arab nation,
boEh peoples and governments, and at their head, the palestinian Arabpeoplb. rt is with this ain'that the Arab nation owes lt to
itself to mobilize ite full military, hunan, material and spiritual
potential to actively assisE EtE Palestinian Arab pcople in t,he tiberatisn
of Palestine and, at the Plesent. sEagc of the Palegtinien arned revoluEionr
to offer unsEinEingry to Ehe palestinian Arab peopra every atd and every
material and human support, to provide thcm with every meana and facllity
to conEinue to fulfir their lcading role, to carry on their arned revolution
until Eheir fatherland ls liberated.
ArEicle 16
From the spirituar viewpoinE, the liberation of palestine wiII endorrr the
Holy Land wit,h an atmosphere of peace and calm in whieh the hory praces
will be safeguarded and which wiII guarantee freedqn of rcligion and will
allow entry by everyone, regardless of race, colour, ranguage or rerigion.
rt is for Ehis reason that Ehe pale.Einiane hope for aupporE frm arr the
spiritual f orces of ttte world.
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ArEicle 17
From Ehe human viewpoint, the liberation of Palestine will restore to the
Palestinian his honour, his dignity and his freedfir. The palestinian people
therefore counE on the supporE of cveryone in the world who belleves in man,s
honour and his liberty.
ArEicIe 18
From the international viewpoint, the liberation of palestine is a defeneive
action dicEated by the needs of self-defence. The palesr:-nlan Arab pcopla,
desirous of maintaining ties of friendship wiEh all peopres, therefore count
on the support of all States which believe in freedqn, justice and peace,
so EhaE legality will be restored in Palegtine,and its cornmunity rill be able
to exercise national sovereignty (wataniya) and nat,ional fneedqn .(gaoumlye).
Articlg 19
The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the creation of Israe1 are nuII and
void. regardless of howmuch time pasaes before the Bituation is reversed,
since they conflict with the will of the Palestinian Arab people and their
nat,ural right Eo t,helr fat,herland. The creation of Igrael and'the partition
of Palestine frqn which itstcmtted are therefore in contradicEion with the
united NaEions charter and above all wlEh the right of peopres to self_
deEermina Eion.
Article 20
The BALFOUR Declaration, the PalesEinian mandate and the cnsuing develop-
ments will be considered null and void; the clai.ms of a histcrical and
spiritual link beEween the Jews and Palegtine arc lnecnpatible wiEh the
historical facts or with Ehe real conceptions frcrn which the concept of
statelrood derives. As Judaism is a,divine (i.e. revealed) rerigion, it
cannot constitute a naEionariEy enjoying an indepcndenE exlstence,.
similarry, the irewa are noE a people with a specific ldentity; on Ehe
contrary, Ehey are the citizene of the states to which they berong.
Article 2 I
In exPressing its existence as an entity through the palestinian Arab
revolution, the parestinian Arab people rejecE any sotrution thaE sought
to reprace the complete liberation of parestine by any other proposar;
they also reject any plan to suppreas or internationaliee the palestinian
problem.
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Article 22
with international
irnperialiarn, which is hostlle tomrd. any frecdm ection and any pro-
grceoioniat aovencnt ln thc world. By mturc it lc a fanatical raclet
novepent, in its eirnr it ia. aggrcaetvc, cxpanslonfut and colonialist and
in lts raethodc it ie trazl'-farcirt. tgracl tg the instrlment of the Zionigt
morltnent and thc human (ln thc scnrG of hunan mcnrbera) qnd geographlcal berc
of rorld inperialian and rcprsttnE! itg,basc and aprlngboard in tl-re very
hcart of the Arab fathcrlerd, frur rhlch to'strikc at the hopea of the Arrb
nation for liberatlon, unl,on epd progrcse.
Articld 23
lhc ncedr of gccurity lnd F!ce, ac usII ae thota of rlght and juet,icc,
rcquire all 8tltGt which are anxious to nalntain fricndly rclatlons bctwccn
peoplea and encure thair citizcns ere loyaI to thclr reepactlvc cduntricr,
to congldqr zibnl$ an llIogeI novcncnt and ben ite cxistencc and iitivttica.
Articlc 2l
The ParegEinian Arab pcoprc bcrievc ln the principrea of Juaticc, llberty,
roncrcignty, sclfdetcrminetion, hunan dignlty and thc. right of thc pa.oprc!
to anJoy them.
Articlc 25
To achievc the ai-ms of thc covcnant and ite principles,_ the pabsEinian r
Libcrat,ion organiration rill fulfLtr itr rora untir thc rlberation of
Paleatine ie conplately achieved.
Article 26
The Palortinian Llberatlon organiaetlon, which reprcaents the paleatlnlan
revolutionary forcal, Ls rcaponaiblc for the movcment of the paleatinian
irab people ln their etruggle for thc rcetitutlon of their faEherland and
its liberation, the restoraLion to the htter and the exercise within its
territory of the right of relf-dateraination. This rcaponsibillty extends
to all fieldgr mllitary, politlcal, financial and cverything th.t the
Paleetine Problom cells for at thc Arab lcvel and the inEernational level.
Article 27
The Palestinian Liberation Organisation will coopdrate wit,h aIl the Arab
acates, each according to its capabiriEies, and will adopt a neutral
attitude tqrards thenr in accordancc rlth the needa of the war of llbcration;
and on this basis iE will not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab
9EAEe.
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Article 28
The pal.estinian Arab pcople emphasiee the dceply rooEed auEhenticity of their
nation!1 revolutlon and thcir independance, and therefore rejecE any form
of int,ervention, trustccahip or gatelIiEe statu.s
I\r-t Lc_le 
-2-?
The palest,inian Arab people have the funbamental, essenEial and auEhentic
right to litrcrate Palcstine and re-establish lt ag their faEherland. The
palestinian Arab people wtlI determine their positlon to{rards Ehe vdrior'tg
Btates end forcaa on Ehe bagie of Eheir attitude tor.rarde Ehe Palestinian
problcnr .nd the dcarec of support they have'glven the Palestinian Arab
people and their rcvolution aimed at achieving the objectives t,hey had .set
thense.lvcs
Article'30
The fighqing forces and t,hose who bear qrms in the war of liberation nake up
the nucleus of Llre Arab army, which wiII conetitut,e the protective force
guaranteeing success for the Pal€stinian Arab people.
Article 31
The Palestine Liberation Organlsation will have a f}ag, an oath and'an
anEhern which wiII be dgtermined by speclal agr€GmenE,.
ArtieIe.32
To the.rticlas of thls Covenant ahall be added the fundamental laws of the
palestine Libcrati.on Organisation laying dorrh Ehe way ln which Ehe Organisation
ehall be cmpoced, itg organs, its cqnmittees, their objectives, obligations
and cqnmitments in accordanec wi.th the text of the Covenant
ArEicle 33
T'he texts of the CovcnlnE may only be amended by a two-thirds maJoriEy of
all the mcmbers of Ehe National Council of Ehe Paleetine Liberation
Organisation meeting in extraordinary seaalon convened for Ehe purpose.
_t6 
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ANNEX 4
TIIE \TENICE DECLARATION, I LUltgt99.o
Middle East
I. '1. The Heads of St,ate or GoverEnent and Ehe l,tlnisters of Forel$n
Affairs held a cornprehensive exchangc of views on all aspecta of the
present situaEion in the Midd1e East, including the ltate of negoEiat,ions
resulting irom the agreements signed betwecn Egypt and Igrae1 in llarch
1979. They agreed that grovring tensiens affecting .this region conctiEute
a serious danger and render a eunprehensive solutlon to the Israeli-Arab
conflicE more necessary and pressing than ever.
2. The nine Member States of Ehe European
,traditional ties and comnon interests which
EaaE oblige them Eo play a special role and
more concreEe v,ray t,o,vards Peace.
Conrmunity consider that the
link Europe to thc iliddle
no^r requLre thcm to work in a
3. In t,his regard, the nine countries of the Conmunlty base theorselveg
on Seeurity Council Resolutiors 242 and 338 and the positions which they
5ave expressed on several occaeions, notably in their Declarations of
29 June L977 , 19 SepEember 1978 , 25 tlarch and 18 {Iune 1979 , as well as
in Ehe speech made on their behalf on 25 SepEember 1979 by the Irigh
Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Ehirty-fourth UniEed Nations General
Aesembly.
4. On the bases thus set out, the time hae cqne to prmote the
recogniEion and implementation of the two principlea universally accepted
by the,inEernational communiE,y: the right to exiatence and to securlty
of al} the SEates in Ehe region, including Israel, and justice for all the
peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate righte of the
Palestinian people . (
p
5. AII of the countries in the area are enEitled to llve in Peace
wiE,hin secure, recognised and guarantccd borders. The necesaary guaranEees
for a peace settlemenE should be provided by the UN by a decision of the
SecuriEy Council and, if necessaEfr on the basis of other mutually agreed
procedures. The Nine declare that, they are prepared to part,icipate wit,hin
the framework of a comprehensive settlement in a sysEem of concrete and
binding international guarantees, including (guarantees) on Ehe ground.
PE 73.161tin. /Ann.4-47-
6. A just solution nuaE finally be found to the PaleeEinian problem,
whieh is not sittrply one of refugees. The Palestinian people, who are
conscious of exist,ing as euch, nuet be placed in a poaition, by an
appropriate process dafined within the franrework of the ccrnprehenslue
peace settlement, to exercise fully their right to self-determinatlon.
7.' The achievement of these objeetlvea requires the involvement and
support of all the parties concerned in the peace settlenent which
the Nine are endeavouring to prcmote in keeping with the principles
formulated in the declarat,ion referred to above. These principles
apply to all the parties concerned, and Ehus the Palestinian peoplc,
and t,o the PIO, rhich w111 have to be agsoclated with Ehe negotiations.
8. The Nine recognise Ehe special irnportance of Ehe role played by
the question of ilerusalem for a1l the parEles concerned. The Nine
atress that Ehey wiIl not, accept any unilateral initiativG deelgned
Eo change tlre sE,atus of Jerusalem and thaE any agreemenE on Ehe city,s
status should guarantee freedqn of access for everyone to thc HoIy Placer.
9. The Nine atress the need for Israc1 to put an end to the territorial
occupaEion which it has maintained since the conflict of 1957, ae it has
done for part of Sinai. They are deeply convinced Ehat the Israelt
seEtlements constiEute a serious obstaele to the peace proceea in the
Middle East. The Nine consider that these seEtlements, as well as
modificaEions in population and property in the occupied Arab EerriEorles,
are iIIega1 under int,ernational Iatir.
10. Concerned as they are to put an. end to vLolence, the Nine consider
Ehat only the renunciation of force or the threatened use of force by all
the parties ean create a clj.rnaEe of confidence in Eh€ area, and consEltute
a basic element for a ccrnprehensive gettlement of the conflict in tte
Middle East.
1I. The Nine have decided to make Ehe necessary conEacts erith all thc
Parties concerned. The objective of these contact.s would be to ascertain
the position of Ehe various parties wiEh respect Eo the principlea aet out
in this declaration and in the light of the results of Ehis consultatlon
process to determine the form which such an initiative on their part
could take.'
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I r'r.mcwork for peaca in th. Irrlddr. E*t rqr.it rt ca.p Drvid
tluhanmad ANr.r Al-S.drr, Er.rid.nt Ot thG Arab Rcprblic of Egtytt, and
'lcnach.l! Begin. Drir ilini!Err of rlnrl. [ct uith Jlmy cortcr. Dratldant
of the tlnited..stato! of Ah.ricr, at caop Drvid trol 5 sapt.6cr to I.
17 scptcobcr, L97o, and havc agr.d on th. lotlovrng f.ncuork lor p*ctin th. ltlddl. Eart- lhey invlte oth.r p.rtiQr to th. Ar.b-t.r..lr eotrfrtct
to .dhcra co it.
PNEAIBLE
Thr rcarch for p..cr in tho rirddrr E tt rurt br guldod by th. torr*rngr
- t'hc rErccd baiir for a pcacrtul ..tc1.0.[t of th. conlltct Drtuon
lrrael and ltr ncighbourr [t unlt.d flettonr s.curity council R..olutlon 2a2,in cll, lt! p.rtr.
- Aft.r four uarl during lO lnrrr, d.lplta lntcnrlvr huurn tttortr,
thc riddlc Er!r. yhich fu th. cradrc of civlllmtlon rnd th. birthpl.c. ot
threc graet rctlgionr, do.r not y.t .njoy thc blorringt o! pracl. Ito
poogle of thc nlddlc Er.t !r.!rn for pracc to th.t the.vr.c hrsrn .ndi.tu'l rclourcer of thr .gron crn be turncd to tha p'raurtr of Faca
and ro that thi3 !rc! can bcconrr a rodor lor co-.rlatcncc tnd cooFratlotr
.rong nrti,ons.
- Thc historic initlatlv. of pr.lident srd.t ln vlliting ar.rur.lc.
.nd thc rccegtion accordcd to hio by tho parlia..nt. govarnrant rnd ttoplaof r!r"e[, .nd th. rcciprocal vl.it of psi.n. ninirt.r B.gtn to r[rtli.,
the peacG proposak m.de by both loederr, lt wtll ar thc uera rGceDtion of
chere micrions by thc pcopler o! both couitricr, h.vo crGated .n urpre-
c.d.ntcd opportuniey for peacc uhlch nur! not bc lort if thrr gnnoretron
ond futurc gcnerettonr tre to bc ap.rcd thr trtgcdica o! urr.
- The provisiona of the chrrtGr of th. unrtcd Nrtions .nd thc othGr
accepted normr of internation.r lav rnd lGgtti'acy nor provrdc acc.pt.d
sEandardr fbr the conduct of rclrtlons anong all ttat.t.
AIEX 5
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To !.hicvc r rclatlonlhlp of peacc, ln tho rptrtt o( Jtrticle 2 ol
che Unitod N.tioni Chartcr. fuEurc ilegotintlotr3 bctvccn Itrlol and lny
nerghbour prcJrrcd to nGgotitrc Porc. and .Gcurlty vlth it, ara naceatlry
for thc Frrpo.c o! cerrylng out r1l th. provlrionr rn6 princlplrr of rcro-
lutions 242 and 338.
- Pa.ce requlrer r.!P.ct lor th. tov.rGlgnty, tcrrltorl.l lntcarlty
and gctleical lndopcntlcnce of rvery,rt.ta ln th. r8.. end thoir rlght to
live in pcacc vithln !.cura and rccognkod bound$lar frcr lror thre.tt or
acEr of torcc. Prograta tolrrdr thrt goal can ldcalarsta oolraoant tdardt
! neu er. o! raconcllr,rtlon ln thc ltlddlo Erlt irrk.d by coopcrrtlon ln
promot,ing ccononic dtvrlopcnB. tn lllntalnlng ltrblllty. rnd ln errurlng
rccurity.
- security lr cnhanccd by I rrlrtlon.hlg of llerc,! lnd by cooprntlon
bctvreon nation. erhich anroy noriLl rcletlonr. fn rddltlon, undar th. ter[a
of paece ts.rElc.. th. plrtia. ctn. dl Eha bralt of rcclpreity, agr.a Eo
rpcclal tacurlty arrang.mnt! ruch u d.dlltarlrad ton.t, lilltrd ena-
manE! arcaa. arrl!, rarning itatlona, tha Faaanca of lntrrnrtlonll torc",
liaiton, rgrcrd [.a.urQ. fot oonitorlnE, and oth.8 Gaang.mGntt ur.t thay
lgrec lra utcful.
rRA}IEVIORI(
. Taklng thelc -factort lntd lccorrnt. thc Frtlal rrc dctrrrdn.c.to r.rch
a jutt, coigrchrn.lvc,'end durabtr t.ttldl.nt of ttro lttdcla Erat contllct
through lhc conclution of pcace traatlct besed on Sccurity Councll r.aolu-
:ions 242 and 338 in all Ehcir p.r!.. lllrolr purporl i! to achltve pcacl
and good neighbourly r.Lrtioor. dr.y raaognttc Chrt, for P..ca Co anduEa.
it nust invotvc .11 thor. uho htv. t!.cn ro't dlcrply aflcctcd by ch' confllct'
Thcy thereforc rgree that thi. frto.rork .r lpproprlrto ir lnEcndcd by urcr
to constrEute. haris lor Peace not onlybatrrlcn lglrPt and ttrael, but rlao
betrreen Igracl qnd arch of its oth.r nalghbourt rhlch ir prcprrad to n.go-
tiaEe peacc eiEh llr.Gl on thit'berk. l'lth lhat dJrctlve'ln rlnd. Uray
havc agrccd to procaad ar folloYr:
A. lfest, gank and Gaza
1. Egypt,, ttrael, arordsn and th. rcPr.a.ntltlvcr ot !83 P.l.ttinitn
pcoole ahould partLcipetc in n.gotl.tionr on thc r..oluclon ol tho
Palcrtinian protrlen h ell it: .tFctt. to achlcvc Bhat &ractlvc. ncgo-
tiatrons relatlng go Ehc W.a! 8.nk .nd G.z! lhould paoc.cd ln. throc .tageat
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of arord.o Eo bt lotn.d by t'h' '[oe!'d rlPr"onlt?lvcr o! t'ho iahrbltrnte
o( thr tlorq Llrk lntl ortrr Eo n'goll'E' Eh' prlee TnlEy b'El'"n lrrrll
.ndJl,rd.n,l.lklnglnLo.cL.ounglhrlgr..rrrcngreraht.lcnthrllnrlrtrtul
o!Eh.tlrrgllnkeod6ere.thrnlgctlrtlon.!h.tlbrbrrrdon.llt,h.
provlrlonren6prlnclptelotuut.curlGycouneltR.lolutlon2.2.Th.
n.gotr.Elonrultlrorolvr,.mongoEh.rnrtEoEtlth.tocrElono!t,h.l,oun-
daEt.t rnd Ghr nrBur. o! tho ..curlty.rr.ng.!.rntr. ttrr roruEloa tror th'
n.gottrllon. ou.t tllo rrcognl" Eh' l'gltlort' ltght' ot tho Prl"tln'
p.oPL. .nd Bhoir ,ult rcquir'r'nt!' ln tht' Y'y' Ch' Prlortlnlrnr wlll
prrtlot9lt. ln chr 'lcttrulnrllon o! thclr ovn tuturc throuqhr
(ll Tho n.fotlrBlont rmong llYFtr 
'rtltl' 
Jotd'n rn6 th' r'?Errrntrltv't
otth.lnhibltrntro!thrt{..tDrntrn.lo.'.!o.9r..onEh.tln.I.trgu.
atEh.l{.'ilrnkrndorlrrn.loth.lourrtrndlngllrurrbylh..ndot!h..
tr.n.ttlonal Plrlod'
(llSrrbulttlng!h.lrlgr..o.nBEolvoE.byEh.olrcGrdrogrlrrntltlvu
of th. lnhrbttancr o! gho It'E Drnk and Clll''
(!t ?rorlltlng lor ch' cltet'd s'Pr"'nt'!lvor o! Eh' tnhrbthnE' o! Eh'
irrc lrnk rnd cor. Eo d.olat. hou th.y .h.rt gotrarn thrr,rolvr. GoilllE'nE
vlBh thG prwlllonr o! th'lr Agr"o'nt'
({)P.sElclp.Elngt..tltdeborolnth.Uorko!th.cornmlt,tronrgotlrttng
tho FlG. Tr..Ey b'tucan lrrrol end Jordrn'
2.Alinocrrreryn.l.ur..wll'lbrt.kcn.ndprovlrlonrnld.Eo..tur.Eh.
..curlEyoll.r!ctrndtt.nolEhbourrdurlrrgth.Br.nllEionelporlodrnd
beyond.Tor..l.ilnprovtdlag.uchrlcurlEy,.'lrongtocrlpottertorcc
util b. conrElEut.d by Ehr r.I!-tov.rntng .uEhollty. rE wil! b' comPo"d
o!lnhrblt.nt.cfthGv{c!cD.nk.ndoitr.thopollcrylllrnrlntalncon.
tlnulngllrlrononlntcrn.L.Gcurltylrr!t.s.Ilthth.drrlgnrtrilrlrroll,
arordrnl.tn. rnd BgyPElon of!icrrr'
3.Durlngth.Erantittonrl'prriod'r'Pr'r'ntrElvolo!Dgy?t'Irrr'l'
{rordln., rnd Eha rltt-govcrnlog ruthority utt'I con't'ltut' ' contlnutnE
c.,iltillEo€todo€l.t.lryrgrlamnBonEhcnodatlEtrro!ollnhrlonotFa.ont
d'ptrcod lril th. wo't' Blnk 
'nd ortr 
ln 196?' gog'gh'r ulEh nocerrrry
il..tur.! Bo Pa.v.nE dl'ruPElon rnd dlrordor' Oth'r mtt'rr o! comon
concoin rnry rlro bl dortt ulth by Ehll comnlEEor'
4. ttgyPt .nd Irrael wtll eork niEh oach oBh'r rnd ulgh other tnt'r'tt'd
paatle.to.tteblirhlgrcr'lprocoduroalorlprolpg'Jurtrndp'rorncnE
topl.crncnlaElonofEh.rclolutlono!thcrclugeoPro'ol.m.
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E_!gvpt_rsrag.t
l. Egypt and rs
i:': jj*::,I:*::,. jril:::ti:li#:ll,"T1;.:':::,i::;:i:..
f,ation!.
2. fn order to aehieuc pctce bctrreenin sood reitn wrtrr a-"".r::":.:-t:::" 
tn:"' th' Plrtlet rErGG to n.gori.r€
o! thir franework 
t  goal of concluding within thrtc nonthe'
pa*ies to the ..":, [::';:':"il*::;].;]':: :il:i::. {#:."'
:j:tj::":T;.:::.r", rrrh a vr* ro achlcvins " .*r,"n"n".vc ;rcace 
'nandrsrae,,irrgoJll':r.":.'::ffiTili,:::J::."r:::;*::1.i,T,,
|Jil":1"::'.H:':;:l:l:r:' trr.r.br. ror rhc r'pr.,ont.tron o! rh.rr
L.. AllociltGd prineiolcr
l. Egypt and fsrael 3rrr- lr-- LL_
berov rhourd .ro,r'l"t #: ::.":.::: I:*tot"' 
and prorrrroar drrerrbcd
ncishbours 
- esvpi, rordrn, syrla and ,.liiln].t".1 and crch or ir.
2. Slgnatorier rh,
! rarer .r p€.ce,r;'::':::il:. "T:rj:::::.:r:;,H:f:::.::ilr.:.
abide by all the provirlons of the Chartrto be takcn in this rclpect inrrudc: 
lr of the llnttcd trltloni- st.Er
(al futl recognition,(b) abolichlng econooic bolrcottt,(c) guarantcein;;.;;f".I:, ;,::;";':i: :,"::::fi::,.[.:".:T:::".:;
i;. 
"llllil"j;:r;::,r. 
exprorc po!.ibiririe! for econqlic devcrornont rn
;::, : 
*"" Ji'; ;;" :, ":"il:::;:; il',:l].Ii il ff;'- : "il:,':'.'*J"
l;, ,jjlili,;."1:::::," lhould be crtabllrhad lor rhe trrutulr lcttr.ocnr of
5. The United Stat.
H :::. il T : ..;" ;: :.:*i: :::: :i t. f:":il::i-:,':i:'^t::;:.. "th. parties. yrng out of the obligettonr of
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6. ?he United Nttlonr Sccurity Council lhall ba rrquctt.d to endorre tha
peac€ Treatie! and cnlurc urat thelr provirions rhatl not br vloletrd.
Tlrc p(.rrnanont ilemlrer! of thc sacurity council rhelt be r.quo.ted to under-
urite the pcace Treltiar rDd entura raap.ct for thair provirl,ona. ?hcy
rhall also bc rcquertcd to conloro thGlr policiaa rnd actlona sith thc
undertakin-os cont.in.d ln thlt trencvork.
8R4}IEI{ORX FOR ?HE COIICLUSION OP A PEAEE TREATT BEII{EEN EETPT AIID ISRAEIJ
In order Eo achi.rvo Facr beElrGcn Ehco, Irracl and Egypt agrea to
negotiaEe ln gcod €lith xith'a goal of concludlng rithln thrGG oonch! of
Bhe rigning of this frenowork ! pcacc Trcaty bctrc.n UrGo.
. lE i3 egBcad thrcs
The liec of the ncaoc,l.tlon! vill be under a unitcd u.tlon. fl.g at,
a location or Lsationr to b. hututlly rgracd.
AlL ot tho princlple! of uN Resolution 242 vill eppty ln lhir rcrolu-
ticn of the ditputc brtuc.n Irr.Gl and Egypt.
Unlc!! othcrri.G outuelly agr.ed, t.rrt of thc pc.cc Trerty yltl bc
iuplenrented brturcn tro .nd three yearr eftcr thc pc.ce Tr.lty k rigmcd.
The folleing lltteil erc egrced b.tu..n Chc pertierr
(a) The full cxorclrc of Egyptlrn soncrolgnty up !o thc lnt.rnrtlonrlly
recognired bordcr betue.n Eglpt and Eandetad ptl,aattna,
(b) fhc withdrlual of, ltracll arned forcar froGr thc Slnals
(c) The uae of alrficlds lcft by Eh. rsra.lis ncar El Arirh. Reflh,
. Ra. En il.qb, and Sharm El Sh.ikh for ctvilian purporcr only,
kcluding porriblc coruncrclal use by all nationg;
(d) The righl- of fr.. p!.r.96 by shipa of rtraar through thc Gu!! o!
Suer. rnd thG Shr.r Canal on the berir of th. ConrtrntinoF!...
Convont.ion of l8gg rpplytng to all nrEion!, the Strait, of Tlran
and the culf of Aq.ba alr intern.tl,on.l vrtaryly, to bG oFn to
all nations for unimpadcd and nonrulpendable fraldorl of nevlga_
tlon and overfltght;
(e) Thc con.truclion of a hlghvay betwcen thc sinai and rrorden na.r
EIat ulth guarrntGed free arrd porcoful par..ge by Egypt and Jordan,
and
(ft The rCrt,ionrng of rhilltrry lorccr tlltad brloy.
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AnltEx 6
PN.INCIPLES OF A PLf,N FOR PEACE
IN THE IiIIDDLE EAST
-
s.res Interview by crown Prlncc FAIID uith th6 studl Pr.tt'Agency.
7 Auguet 1981
,There are a nurubcr of principles on whlch I lust lcttlcfirht
night be baged, and these are }aid dorn ln thc rca6luglonr laopt.d
and confirmed by the United Nationr ovGr thc laat tcr y..t't.
These PrinclPles are:
1. Withdrawal by Iarael f,rm aII the Arab tsrrttoric!^occuphd'
during th€ 1967 war, including thc Arab Bector of J.ru!r1tn..
2. Bemoval of all Israelt settldnentr frcm Ehc tcrritory occuplcd
in 1957.
3. cuaranteed freedm of worihlp for all lglamic rcllElonq tn.Fhr
HoIy Iand of Palestine.
4. RecognlEion of the right of repatriation of the two nlllion
Palestinian refugecs and of the right to cmpcnsttion for tholq g,ho
do not wish to return.
5. Placing the WesE Sank anC the Gaza Strip under lrf luP.rvlglon lor
a transitlonal period of a fow montha only.
6. Creation of an indepondenE Palestinlan StatE wlth Jeruralc|! rr ltr
capita I
7. Recognition of the rlght of atl th€ state8 In thc region to llvo
in peacc.
8. Application of the principlea llsted abotre Eo b€ Eulrantted by thc
United Nations or a numbar of itg members"
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The fol[ouing are the key points of the reso[ution adopted unanimousty
at the conference of Arab Heads of State at Fez, g-10 septenber 1962:-
1. The vithdravat of Israel from al.t Arab territories occupied in 1g6?
inctuding Arab aI eods (Jerusa[em),
2. The dismantting of setttements estabLished by Israel on the Arab territorles
after 1967,
3. The guarantee of frcadom of uorship and practice of retigious rites for
a[[ religions in the hoty shrines,
4- The reaffirmation of thc Patestinian peopte's right to seLf-determination
and the exercise of its inprescriptib[e and inaLienabte nationaI rights
under the Ieadership of the Palestine Liberation organisation (pLO), its
so[e and legitimate representative, and the indemnification of aLI those yho
do not desire to return,
5. The hlest Bank and Gaza Strip to be pl.aced under the controt of the United
Nations for a transitory period not exceeding a fer months,
6. The establishment of an independent Palestinian State uith At eods as its
capita[ (Jerusatem),
7- The United Nations Security.CounciI to guarantee peace anong aIt states
of the region including the independent patestinian state,
8- The United Nations Security Council. to guarantee that these principl.es
are respected.
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ANND( 68
Dccerpt frqn Pr.esi&nt Reagan's 
.speech of lseptenber 1982
outlining the Unitcd States, proposals ofr palestine
..."TtE Iebanon war, tragic as it ms, has left us wittr a nev, oi*htrtu-
nrty for Midd1e Easi peace. trle must seize it rpru and bring peac€ to ifiis
troLlbled area so vital to rrcnld stability wtrile there is stitt tinE. It
rias with this strong cqrvictior that over a npnth a9o, before the present
negotiations in Beintt had been ccrpleted, I directed Secretary of State
shurtz to again revien o.rr poricy and to consult a wi& range of otrt-
standing Anericans on the best ways to strengthen chanoes for-peace in
the Dtiddle East. [{e harre consulted with nrany of the officials r*ho verehistorically involved in the process, with nernbers of the Congress and withindividtals frcnr ttre private sector. And I have held otensi\re oonsultations
with my cmr advisors on ttre principles r wirr outrine to 1lqr tonight.
fhe evacrration of the PIO frcnr Beinrt is rrcry ccnplete, and re can nchr
helP the I€banese to rebuild their war-torn crunfry. l{e orc it to curselves,
and tognsterity, to no\re quickly to build rryon this achievHrcnt. A stable
and revived Lebanon is essential to all qu tryes for peae in the region.
The people of r.ebanon desenre the best dfforts of the internatiqral ccnnunityto turn ttte nightmares of the past several years into a nen dann of trcpe.
tlre qportuni!,igs for peace in the ltiddle East & rrct @in and
end in Lebanon. As ne help Lebanon reh,ritd, re nnrst also nrcve to iesolvethe rot causes of conflict betueen Arabs and Israelis.
Ttrc war in Iebarpn has denpnstratcd nrany ttrings, hrt trto consequences
are key to tlre peace pr@ess.
First, the mititary losses of the PIO have not diminished t}te yearning
of the Palestinian people for a just solution of their claims; and secondr-
while Israelrs rnilitary successes in lebanon harre &rcnstrated that its
anIEd forces .rre second to none in tte regior, ttrey alcre cannot bring jgst
and lasting [Eace to Israel and her neigtrbors.
The question ncmr is trcr.r to reconcile Israel's legitirnate security
concerns with the legitirnate rights of tlre Palestinians. And that ansurer
can only crne at the negotiating table. Fach party must recognize tttat the
outccne must be acceptable to all and that tnre peace will requirre ccnpro-
mises by all.
So, tonight f am calling for a fr,esh start. Ttris is the nunent for allthose directry concerned to get involved - or lend their sL{Iport - to a
wrrkable basis for peace. the Canp David Agreorent rsnains lhe foundation
of our policy. Its langruage provides aII parties with the lee-way they needfor successful negotiations.
I call on Israel to make clear that the security for vrtrich she yearns
can only be achieved through genuine peace. A peace ieqr:iring rnagnaninity,
vision and cor:rage.
I call on the Palestinian people to recognize that their orm politicalaspirations are inextricably bound to recogni[iqr of rsrael,s rijfr'i toa sec'ure future.
And r carr on the Arab states to accept the reality of rsraer - andthe reality that p9ac9 and iustice are to [:e gained onri trnou!n-r,"ra,fair, direct negotiation.
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In makirq thcse calls upon ottnrs, I recognize tnat the tnited statestns a speciar responsibirity-. No orther natiqr-is in a positiqr to &al witJrthe key parties to tlre cqrriict qr the basis oi t*"t *a ,iioirity.
The ti,rE has cufie for a rpw realism on tlre part of alr the peqles ofrhe Middre East. rhe state of rsraer is an 
"".r,iri"tfr tITt &servesthchallenqed legitinracy yrithin tt ."rr*6tv-# natiqrs. tut rsrel,slegitimacy has thus rar reen recogrnized uy-[J-r.r, co,ntriesr 
€rld has been&nied by errcry Arab state er(ocpt-F45pt. i"r*f-oists; ii-ti"l right toocist in peace betrind seqlr€ anh ei6iirui"-uo"er", 
-a it- t"*-a right todemand of its neigtrbors that they recognize t*r*. facts.
the war in r'ebanon has &ronstrated another.reality in the regian. rhe,aegarture of tle Palestinians fron Beint ar.o"ti""s nrcre,ttran ever tlrehcneress:ess ctf the PalestiniF n+l;.iiil"tinians-ieer stil.,grv trrattheir cause is rrcre_+r a_questicr-;it;i";;; r agree. rhe carp David.AgreenEnt reoognized ttrat fict r,n:n it 
"pG "i'tr= regitirnate rigfits ofthe Palestinian peopre ana trreir :*t-.6oiH"t:. Elor peae to en&rre,it nnrst involve hr trnse r*ro Gve been r;J-Gprv affected by the ccrflict.only tJtrough participatior irr tG-pe#pr*.ss 
- trDst-inrcdiateryby Jordan and ry tJre iafestini",'s - will fir*i be able to rest q.gi&*in the Isprrredqe ttrat its se.,r1r!I 
""a--t tiw.wilr be respec+ed by itsreighbors' otiv trrougtr-the-pi*"  of rngotialim can all the natiqrs ofthe !{iddle East achie6 . 
"ecirre peaae.These tlren are or general goars. t{hat are t}re specific nery an=ricanpositionsr ard ntry are rle taking-ttrcrn?
fn the Carp David taLks thus far, both Israel and E$/pt harrc felt freeto o<press qenly their vier*s as to v*rat tre *t;-. shoritt u". Una"rstandably,their vievrs harrc differed on nrany points.
the united states has thus ta5. sqrgtrt.to play the role of nediator;ye have avoided public crcrrrEnt on the_r."v-i.",rE". rc have alrnys rercgnized
- and continue to reoogniz-e 
- that- only it *i*t"rv agreerrEnt of tlroseparties nostdirectry involved in the *"rii"i 
"*prd.ia! * ;er"irrgsolution. But it has becqre evident t" rr=-*, isqre crearer sense of&ierica's position on ttre key i-sue" ii n.o"*"rv to encourage widersupport for. the peace procesi.
First, as outlined in the CanP. David accords, 
-ttrere must be a periodof tinre dr'rring wtrich the Parestinian i"lr"bitallt" or tn" hlest Bank and Gazawill have fr:Il autonorqr o*r tr,.i. *-irril;.'Dr. cqrsi&ratiqr rustbe given to the princ-iple of ;u-dve;;;i-or-* inhabitants of theterritories and to ttre iegitftnate secrrrity *6*" of the parties inrptved.the purpose.of the S-year period of transitiqr drich rm.rrd beginafter firee erections ror a'seugr.*i'g e"r.=ti1ia1 auttrority is to proveto the palestinians ttrat tfey can nrn ttr6ir o*r-iff"irs, and that srrcf,Palestinian autoncnry poss no threat to rsraelrs security.
the united states will not support the use of any additional land fortle purpose of setrlerents durinq q. +,;i;;;riod. Ind".d, the innediatea@tion of a settlenent freeze 6y fsrael, ,rrcr tirn any other action,could create the corrfidence ne.a.a for wider participation in these talks.F\rrtter settlenren! ?+i"itv is-in no way neceisary for the sec-urity ofrsrael and onlv dtuninishe"'trp ;;id;;L;;#ilabs trrat a final o.rtcurEcan be freely and fairly negotiited.
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r Hant to make the Auerican position clearly understood: ite prrposeof this transition period is t}e peacefi-rl and orEerty transr&-or O*="ticauthority frcnr rsrael to the paleltinian irrhabitants of the [Est Bank andc'aza' At the sane tine, srch a transfer rust not, interfere.rrith rsraet'ssecurity requirefiEnts.
Beyond the.transilior period, as hrs look to the future of the tEStBank and cazd,, it is clear to ns that peace canno't, be achie\red by tle forrnatiqrof. gn indepen&nt palestinian state tuLtt*e i"*it"ii.".-iJ-iI'ia
achievabre on tlp basis of rsraeri sovereignty; permanent cqrtnor overthe hbst Bark and Gaza.
so the united states will not support the establistnent of an inaepenibntPalestinian state in ttE West Barrk anh'caza, 
"rrd re ,rtii il G;ft alrrp:ta-tiqr or permarent oontrol by Israel.
There is, tptrever, anorther $ray to peac€. Ihe final status of tleselands nust, of cqrrse, be reached itrqit tf= lirrc-ana-tate of negotiaticrrs.B'tt it is the firrr viery of the t nited s[ates-tf,at self-goverrnent by theParestinians of tlrei l{est Bank and Gaza in association with oordan offersthe best ctrarre for a &rrable, j,st and r"Ji'g-p""..,
r€ base o5. annroagtr sguarely on the principle ttrat the Arab-rsraelicorflict -shotrld be resolved ttrot6h ,-g"Eiiii,*r"' irr..f.rirrg an o<charqeof territgrY for peace. this o<chinge I" 
"n"trin"d in united NatiqrsSecurity Council Resolution 242, d.rich i", in t*rn, incorpoiatea in all itspaft's in the carp David agreenrents. u.N. Resolution 242 il;fi" naroffyvalid as the foundation stone of Arerica'" uioar. East ped 
"rro.t.rt is ttre lnitea statest position that - in return for peace _ thewithdrar,uar provisian of Resorulion 242 
"pgii"=To au frqri"I-ir,.rrraing the[Est Bank and Gaza.
when the border_is nego'Eiated betrcen Jordan and rsrael, o1r vieur .'rttle ertent to wtrich rsrael sho,rrg b" asrJ I" F* tp territory wirr beheavily affecled by the extent of tnre pd*-da rnrrnalizatim and thesecurity arrangeflEnts offered in return.
Finally, v€ relnain oqrvinced that Jerusalem rmst rernain undivided,hrt its finar status stpurd be decidee ir*.rgh 
""g"tiations.In the cotrrse. of ttre negotiato_ns to ccme, the United States wil1slrpport positions that seenr to us fair and ro*n"or" ry;*iL, *a rikeryto prqnote a sound ryrearent. r{e hrirr .r; ilt ionmra cur cturr detairedprqrosals r*rcn rte Lrelierre they can be_helpfii. a"a, rnake nomistake, theunited states wil cppose ar./prposar 
- i'rcnr 
"r,v 
p"rtv and at any polntin the negortiating Process - ttnt-threatens tne 3ecurity.of rsrael. Arcrica.sccmruitnent to the security of Israe1 i" Irq,"fad] ana f might add, so is mire.During the past few days, or.rr ambassadors in rsraer, Eg14>t, Jordanand saudi Arabia have presei'rted to their n"=t-g;r.,r*r,ts the proposals infirll detair thar r hava outlin&- here tqright]-''
r am convinced that tlrese orqrcsars can bring justice, bring secr:rity,and bring durability to an Arab:rs;;;ii-p";;:'-'=
The united states will stand by- lhese principles with total Hicatickr.they are fully consistent with is."er'" 
"".irriiv-iequrrenent"-*a trc aspi-rations of the Parestinians. we ,iii-t^o.r.-Iii-io'uro.aen participation atthe peace tabre as ervisaged rv tne c"rrp ;;; JI""ra.. anh r teilrLtry mpethat tlre patesrinians and-.lordln, witn i*;**; 
"f-th.i, L!I-oo[.agues,will accept this qportunity."...
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IDTION FOR A RESOLUTION
i
tabled by lrtr p. LAITOR
. 
., , puruuant to Rure 25 of tho Rurca of procedure
on the eituatlon in South Lebanon
i,
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Thc Europcan Ptrllrrncnt, \
- eonridcrlng thc dcclrntlon of thc flno on tho rltuetlon ln thr
Lcbuon,
- coneidcrlng thc pllght of tho Lcbrnom poople rnd tho humrn rufforlng
crurcd by thc contlnucd .trto ol war ln thr countryr
- considaring tha rcc.nt bombrrdncnt of lrl.h tntfll troooe ln the vtllagc
of Brr-Shlt, and thc holdlng of hortagu rt A1-Ilrl by thc Heddad forccl,
- 
concidcrinE Ehc Pelcgtinlan ettrck on the l(ibbutz Mlrgar-Am,
- 
whereea the Sccurity Councll rnrndrtc to thG lrnifil torccg, r+hlch hae
becn rcncwrd four tlncr, celle lor thc rcrtoretion of, thc euthority
of thc Lcbaneac covernn nt rnd th. tupGrvirlon of tho wlthdrawal of
cxternel ermod olcnontlr
1. Calla on thG Forrlgn tllnhton of th. Nlno noctlng ln pollticrl
cooSlcratlon to
(a) inrlst on ln lrrecll wlthdrawel from South trbrnonl
(b) intcnrify thrlr rf,fortr to rartora pracq rnd thc lGgitinet.
authority of th. Lebencro Oovcrnmcnt,
2. Condemns thc .ttrcka on thc klbbutz tt l{lger-Nn;
l. Oondcnna thc rcccnt rttrckt on Unlfll'fot"u" rnd the holdlng of
Irirh Unlfi.l troopr r! hortrgcr by thc Hadded forccr;
4. Begueata thc PrcaidcnC of thc Europcrn ParllamGnt to eubnit thic
notion for e rcrolution to tha Prorldent of thc Oouncil of Forclgn
Minictcre rncctlng in political cooperation.
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IN.IEX 8tluropean uommunltles
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Wbrking Doqrments
l9g0 - lggl
DOCUMEITT 1-10I,/80
I,TOTION FOR A RESOLI,'TION
tabled by ttrs CHARZATT ltrs ROUDY, tlr SARRE
and Mr LOO
pursuant to Rure 25 0f the Rules of procedure
on the situation in the lfiddle East
PE 73.16tt1n. /Ann. E
Engtish rd,,,on
-63-
-:-'.-{i
flrc Europcarr P.rr I ilmr.rrt,
- havlng regard to the.fact that a 
.juet
about only on the bacic of en ovarall
Securlty Council Rerolutlonr 242 and
l. Recallr.rhat tire grcopler
exiatence and aecurlty Of
aecurity;
and latting peacG cen bc brought
tettlenaent elonE tha llnc. of
338,
- havtng regard to the faet that thare eannot be nore than one ray ofeEt,ablishing a juEt and Laeting pelce and that the Israelo_Egyptian
peace treatf in accordance with tho crmp David agreenenta conatr.tutcsfor ite signatories a.first stop tou.rds an overell lettrcncnt to end30 yeart of hostility end nlatrutr,
- having rogF'tr to trr* f.rcc tlrnt tho Europo.n cq$.uniEy orrcr rt toitacr,f to uprrorcl tlrr.- rirrrrt of tlrc state o! rrratl to llvo In 1rcaceand sccuricl'within safc frorrticre rccognrzcd by aII,
- havlng rcaard to the flct rhat thc palertinians, rikr ar,r peoplcr, eroentitled to a hqnerand within e lcael freneuork that rt wrll be forthe parties to dctcrnine througlr ncAotiatlon,
- having regard hrrwe'ver to the frct that rn rtr chertcr and rn .trtqrclrtaby its readers tlre- parestine Lrberatlon organization contrnues toa3rert that ita objectivc ia to dcttroy the St.te of trrecl, thc veryexictencc of t*lriclr lt rcfucer to recogni2cr lnd to conrtruct not
alongridc but in itc pleee a palcetintan State,
2. CaIIs' (ou rr.ep..cE Of thr. Bo\.rrl.tritlntyr tcrrit,Orial intcArity andindlipcnrrr'nr'r'(\t rr.1r'h ststrr irr trrr. region and its rigrrt to rlvG rn.peace witr:in s.rfe frorrtr.(rra rsrcorJnlzacr a! psrt of a reglonar egutlr-briun lndepencent of blocc that involvea the creation of derrilltarlzed
zonea i
3. Acknoul(rdilrrs thit .r irrsl inrl ljrlt irt.1 p..;11... will lr.tyr. to taka aceountof t}r-' le'r;titimats. riqtrt s of trrr. parectirrions,.
4. Considers that the rights of the one sidedetrinent of rhe rights of the othery
5. Resoluterl'opp.aes any de facto recognition of the pLo !o rong ar itscharter ccnlinues to proclarrn tte deterninetion not to rccogmr.zc but todestroy the State of fsrael;
6. trrgc! the Heads of State and Gor.ernmcnt of the Nine and thelrltini3t!'rs for p63e!qrr At'fairs no. to irnpecre application of thecamp D*'ic Agrr'r'mr-r^ts, thr. orr[1, peace procegs ctrrrentll. c.ffcctivcin the Hitldlr. E.t8t. witlr ill-tintcl dcclarations;
7' tnstructc its prerident to forward thie resorution to the Headcof state' govern'enta and parrramentc of the ,{mbcr states and, Ls LE- CJI(a
,t-: 
*.' j":ll ::j 
-:*""i e c l on 3!._-1.: -""'ope a n commun i t r e s .
it repreeentr 
.re deeply corullttcd to thcIrrael end to 
,the moane of attalnlng ttr
cannot be acserted to the
-. 
----'..^... :':
,c. f{n'FT'l l'i'B??:t, :i,[r"J-]r;;,:.].:'=i*,;" .][_ .
elolEx 9
-
European Comrnunities
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Wbrking Documents
J
t
linglirh Edirion
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Docrltns! L-174/@
.;
on the expulalon
?he EuropGan Parlltncnt
- @nc€rncd at the rclnat.d tttcmte by the tadcl!. (Sveiuront to
ualntain a nllltary Pa.!.nco ln thr occirplcd terrLtorlsc tn
contempt of thc IIf, icrclutlonl,
F whercas thla occupatlon fornr I orioui obsteclr to rny eitclptr
. 
to flnd e..pollttcrl aolutloa to th. eon0lct,
- Bavlng regard to thc tePGated.Eal.ufct tb eonfl.catc land on thc
.- l. Drproreer lta rtrong protcet rt thG cxprlrton it ttc nalort of
' 
. Ecbron and Haltiuli
. 2. Reguelt. the @uncl,l of the $uropran Gilnuntty t6 tako ncaturcr
to pu! an cnd to all pcrroc.utl,on of thc lcgltlnatc rcPret.ntatlvoc
the lnhabttanta;
.' 3. Rcqucatr thG Ouncll to talcc porltlvr actLoD to dovclop thc
' tnltlativer lt har rovcral tlncr utnouncld for crcatlag tho
notorrar!' cqrdttloac lor i poacoful plutlon to thc ontltct 
,
ln thc tliddle Eastj
4. tnatructr tts presldcnt to foruard thl.l rcrolutl,on to tbc Ouncll
of the EuroDcan Oodrunlty. :
o
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AI.INEX- 10
European Communities
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Wbrking Doqrments
t980 - r98l
Doct IrrEltT r-819/80
MO4TION FOR A RESOIJI,MION
tabled by Mr dTORUESSON, l.lr ALBER, Itr PEDINI,
!i[r pFLIMLINT Mr FISCHAnin, Lady ELLES, trtrs FOURC,ADE,
!!rs MOREAI,,, TTr GAI,IAI{DI llr BEYER de RYI(E, IrIr DOUEI.ET,
Iilr TTIRCAT, Mr FERGUSSON.
pursuant to RuIe 25 of the Rules of Procedure
on Lebanon
PE 73.1661f in./Ann. 10l:nglrsh lrlrtion '67 -
lrhe Euroqgan Parli.arent,
t
- 
Convinced tlrat thc rcctoretlon of a lerting P.tc. ln thc lllddlc
Eatt rcguirer the cetabllrhnent of dlplonrtlc and political rclationg
which uill guarentee to each of, Ute ltatt! of the reglon relp€ct
for i.ts territorial intagrity and recognltion of its right to live
within Becure and rccognized borderl,
- 
Anxiour to urake its contributlon to t tolutlon of ttrc problen
of Lebanon, whieh currently lr one of the prlncipal cantrea of tensLon
likely to inflane the rhole rcAlon,
I - EndorsLng tlre resolution adoptcd by the Europcan Councll on 2 lrecGtnb€r
1980 which reaffirna that onc of the obJcctlver of the f,l,ne'l actlon
for peace rn ttre ltlddlc EaBt 1,. to rGltore Ilbanon wLthln the integrity
of ite borderr and to the full oxerche of itr natlonal lovereignty,
' 
- Utrderlinlng ltr rolldarlty and tttlehrnt to thc Lbrn.aa pcoplc rrhoce
tradition of tolerance and opcnnals hae allowed tJre hamntoul co-
exirtence of culturer and rcligionr wtthln one nrtlonal comnunlty, and
anxioug to see the lndlvlduallty of thla people proteeted agaLnrt attempt!
at destablllaation and donlnatlon pcrpctratod on lpbaneac t rritory by
forelgn Potrera,
- 
ytishing to glve ite expreaglon of eolidarity an Lnctttutlonal forn,
I. Calla for tire early crcation of an EEC-l,larhrek parllamntrry delegation
along ttre line of the already opcrational EEC-llA HREB delegation;
2. Asks that a apecial relationship be eataDliahed rrlthin thle delegation
to enable Lebanon tg b. representrd ln conpletc independence of
neighbouring states and revolutionary movements rcceivtng outcide
rupport and -rctive on Lobaneae terrLtory:
3. Inatructa ita Pregident to determine wlth the Bureau of the European
Parliament the rnans of inplenenting ttrl,e reeolutLon undcr conditione
which reapect the righta of thc Lebaneac peoplc.
-68- PE73.16tt;6. /Ann. 10
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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Wbrking Documents
l98l - l9g2
9 October 1981 DOCIII{ENT L-fi3/8L
MOTION POR A RESOLUTTON
tabled by t{rde la MALENE, !,[r AlISetER, It{r CLE!4ENT,
Ur COUSfg, Itlr CRONIN, !{r DA\,ERN, ur DELEAU, trlr DEIIIAU,
ltrs EWING, Itlr FAMON, l,Ir FIANAGAII, ljlr GRONIUI,
I4r ISRAEL, I.Ir JT,NOT, lTr IAIoiR, I.!r de IJrPKowsKr,
Ir{r UEO, Itlr NY:BORG, t{r ngUfLLy, l,tiss De ltAIgRA,
![r \JltE and ]lre I'IEISS
on behalf of the Group of European progreesive
Dernocrats
with requeet for topicar and trrgent debate pureuant
Eo RuIe 48 of the Rules of procedure
on the death of President Anwar et Sadat
PE 73.16lfinlAnn. 11F.nglish Edirion -69-
'llhe Euroocan Parlluoat,
1.
2.
3.
dtoaycd Dy th. traglc dcat! of Drorldcnt Anuar 8adaE,
rceogrnlzlng tlro lnonrc contrlbutlon nrdr by Prcrldort SadaE
to p€rc. ln t{ro t{lddb !.tE rnd ln thr. sorld,
regrcttlng that hk cltortr dld not nrct rdth r tddrr to.PontG,
tfffu:ar tlrr nccd to contlnw tho rcrlr tc polce nndrrtrkon by
Prcrldant SldeEl
Callt on rll tlrc rslaveat CmlllltY bodlcr to trtsc actton ro
.! to advancc tlrc ar,occ troco!. ln thc lltddlc lartt
Inatructe ita Prcrldont to lorward thir rerolutlon to tlrc Cotutcil
and Cmrleelon of thc Europran Cmunitlor and to tlrc !o41gn
nlntgB€rs ncctlnE ln polttlcal ooopcratLql.
I
:'
I
i
I
I
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t" 12 ocroBER 19g1
tF.nglish Eitirion
i
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Wbrking Documents
r98r - t9g2
DOCU!,IENT L-596/8I
MOTTON IIOR A RESOI,UTTON
tabl.ed lry Mr FANTI, Ir{r SEGRE , ylr C,ALLUZZI,
!,rs Bil.F.rUE[, GLORIOSO, l,lr gIROSSfNO, Ir{r FERRERO,
Mr I}ONACC:[NI", Mr SPINEtti, Mr PAPAIETRO, I,Ir LEONAIII)I,
IIL GOI,TIIIER, Irilr DE pasouarn, Mrs crtlcrARr RoDANo,
r{r '1iE}tA'/oLO, prrs BARBARELT,A, Mrs cr\RREroNr RoMAcNoLr,
M.rs SOTJARCIALUPIT Mr CARDIA, I.{r I,'OLITO, Ir{r VERONESI
ar:rl l.lr VfT.\LB
with reqrrest fo:: topical and urgent debate
pursuant to Rule .19 of the Rules of procedure
on the STWAIION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
-71 - PE 73.1661f in. tAnn. 12
---- : 
_
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:
l.
2.
't'lre Europcan ParliaDGnt.
- deepry rhoclcod by thc emlmlnatton of proridrnt Anyar g.d!t,
- lw.r€ of thc grorlng end vcry grrlour thr..t to thc rltuatlon in thcl{iddlc East and the l{odltorrancen,
Strongly condcmna thc arrrrllnatlont
conaidirs it urgont rffcatrvcly to tdro thc poltttcer and dlprooatlc
steps enviaaged by thr Errop.an counclt rn vrnr,cc for tho echr.cvoont
of a generar pcacc in thc tiddrc Batt on thc brrir of tho rovcrclgnty
and tcrritoriat intcgrity of all thc rtatoe of that nglon, ineludlngtgreel, and thc rcarrcrtion of tho rtght of tho par..tlniln 1ro1ilr tothcir onn lndepend.nt atatot 
i
Rrguclt' thc preaidcnt of tho councii to ,.port to lt ln thc nclr futurc
on thc mealuret lt hlr takenr l
rn'tructs rte prcridcnt to fonrerd thlr rorolution to thc councrl, thr
coulgaion and thr govarnn.ntr of thc tlaorhr gteta..
3.
4.
-72- PE 73.1661f in. lAnn. 12
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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Wbrking Documents
l98l - lg82
14 October 19BI DOCUTT{ENT 1_601/81
ITOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
tabled by Ir van AERSSEN, Mr- BLUMENFELD, Ir{r KLEpscH,Iutrs cAssAr[MAcNAco cgRRETir: h venegni, Mr ALBER,Itlr AIGNER, Irtr BARBI, ltr BEUMER, M, ggi;aNf 
,Iulr von BISMARCK, Mr BoCI(LET, Mrs gooT;_!,. BRoK,II{r CLINTON, I,Ir CROUX, Mr DALSASS, r.I.-ig-KEERSITIAEKER,MT DESC}TAMPS, MT ESTGEN, MT FISCHBACH, IIIT FRANZ,I{r Ingo FRIEDRI-CH, Irlr FRUH, Ir{r EUCffi, -t!r 6HERGO,.Mr GfUMIIARRA, It{r HERI{AN, Mr HABSBUnC, U. ,on HASSEL,Mr HAIIN, Ir{r IIELI{', Ir{,r Karl_Hei.nz Hoiir.lellrv,!!r JANSSEN van RAAY, Mr JONKER, M, XefZin, Mr LEltMEfr,Irtrs LENTZ-CoRNETTE,Mr LIGroS, u, tucxinl-u. [uS,tER.Mr IUACARIO, ttrs IIAIJ-WEGGEN, Mr l,tAJONia;,It{T MALANGRE, I.!T MERTPNS, MT WCIIEL, MT II{UI,I,ER-''t{r NOTENBOOIT{, Mr d,Ot{UeSSOl,t, Mr pEDfNI, #''ii*,,,,MT POTTERING, MTs RABBETHGE, MT RYAN, II,IT RINscTu:,It{r scHALL, }tr sAssANo, Mr sI}0NNET, Mrs scrILEIcltEi 
,Mr SCIINI,IKER, Mr Konrad SC[.ION, Mr SEffi,fllCen,Itlr TCILMAN, Mr TIIAVAGIJINI, t{r WAWRZfK, llr wEDEKTlir,).l,lr von WOG,I\U and Mrs WX.i . '--r--'r' '4
on behalf of the Group of the European people,sParty
pursuant to RuIe 47 of the ltules of procedure
on the stabiLizar-ion arrd "extension of peace effr.irr ,in the Micldle East
l:nglirh l:rJirion
-73- PE 73.1661f in. /Ann. 13
'fhe lluropean Par.I iament
- aware of ita responaibility for peace in thc world,
- 
mindful of the efforte being oade to achleve freace in thc tgddle Eaat,
- 
inspired by tlre succeasful visit to thc European parli.aoent by the wjn0er
of the Nobel peace priee. kceident Annar El Sadat of Egypt,
f .CaIls on the Ccruncil and t.hc Conmission:
1. To ensure ttrat the Europcan eonmunity plays an active part in the stabiliza-
tion and extension of the peace offorts of the Egyptian, taraeli and
American Governments and to lnplcmcnt to this effect the l2-point programme
set out below;
2. rlo nake the Dgyptian-reracri parce trcaty an intcar.al part of a nerr
European Community policy for thc llcdJtcrraneani.
3. m'undertakc intcnsive pollcal effortg to bring olher Ar.ai, rtateg irrto
. this Face offeneivc and ite intensification;
4. !o lay, by mean! of addltlonal protocols to thc agrcenentc rith the
I.taghreb, the lrlashrcr and raracl , the foundations for clore rcaional
cooperation on the linea of thc Lom6 Convcntlon;
l-r. To t.rkc legislalive and adninistrativc Eeeaurea tc a deciaive roeang of
combatinq the econouic boycott practircd by the Arab r.eagrre against flrmain the Eurotrran cornmunity which trade wlth the countries involved in the
Peace effort and the conetantly recu'rrlng attemptr by the Arab League to
cxtend this boycott;
6. To pursue aceordingry efforts to extend comprehensive financial, economic,
technical and scientific cooperation as a way of buttressing tre peace
efforts;
7' To set in train a Procelg of concertcd acti.on baacd on economic, finencial
and inveetment-incentivo neasureg ln the forn of projecEa betyeen Egypt,lsrael and thr: Europcan conununity involving allore organg of the community;
{i''l'o nrake provision for a contribution to the deveropnent and extension of
a modern railuay line bctween cairo and Jerusalem wrth connections to \rordan
and Lebanon;
9' To provide ilsaistance in the tapping of water ralources and the exproiLation
of crude oil and lnlneral deposita in the Sinai;
-74- PE 73.166/fin./Ann. l3
I
a
I(t. To provide teehnological
frow€r stations to aervo
thc ltiddle East;
"* 
,rn.*ial agsirtance
tha needs of Egypt, Israel
in the build ing of
and other arcag of
1r' To furnieh develolmcnt aid for the eanalization oll the ltivor rlorrtan anrlthe exploitation of phoaphate depoait! in Jordan by partieipati.n inprojects;
L2- To consider earefulry, in thc tight of therr inpricatl0ns ar regardsjoint European reslnnaibility, ,thc appllcation! Erde by the countriesin thie region to tibnber states for armb auppries and to cnlure thetproportionality ig obaervcd in accordence with thc principres of defence,d6tente :rnd stability;
rr' rnetructs its ttesident to forward thia reaolution to Ehe council. and
Commiasion of the European Corwrunitlca.
-?s- pE 73.166tf in./Ann. 13
Er.plenttory 3trtrrant
Hithcrto, Eurolr'r polltlcrl aptEolch to tlr rlddlr Erlt hlr rcrainod
reaerved arrd eautlour. Ita luroDarn Cnutrtty hrr donc no Fr. then act
aa an obrcrvcr ln thc rolutlon of tlrr t{lddlc Errt confllct. At no tiurc
haa the Lnvolvomnt of Ur. luroD.rn Couunity ln tho tltddlo Brlt p.aco
efforta bcen conanturlt. ulth thr rcalo and lulnrtencc of itc lnterertr
.in the region. Europ.'r dtngerourly wlncrablc touthcn flank with the
conltant thrcet of ncr eonfllctr rnd thr poeribillty of global eceelation
. and the dangcr of 
,thc o11 rrrlna bclrq u..d qein, vith rll that that
inplics for thc ccdrouy and rployrnt in tht BuropGap Conuntty, haa
becn thc rubJcct of no uorc than Jotnt ftttGrntr. Arcng Urc countriec
of thc W€ltGrn Alllencc, thc lr&rour trrt of retivoly eco;lng a eoupe-
heneive aolution lor thc ttlddh Eut eontltct hrr bccn ontrurtcd and left
entirely to thc Unltcd StatG.. Ilrc luropoan Corunity hr. tekcn hardly
any activc pnaetical ncr.ur.! to further thir qu.!t.
' follqvinE thc Camp Davld Agrcannt and tfir frrhtngton frcaty, tt 1. high,{'
...in61;: ilp? that the Europ.ln Comunity crlprlgncd .ctlvcly for peaec ln thc
"'x'"fltilf. 
Eaat, rhlch le I rcglon of lrch obnriour lplttlcal, rtratcAie rnd
ccoponic importanee for turolr. r'lrla lr the trlrtpr. of thle l2-point
Prortricc.
fdor of Prorl8cnt sadat rhorr that euch action ir nou ncrdod mre
hcforc.
fi
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DocuitENT 1-8921E1 ANNEX 1'I
..',
I,oTION 8OR A RESOLUTION
tablcd bY ilr KYRtros
purruen! tb $lc. {7 of gha BulGr of P'roccdurc
. on tlrr lnQ.lrtion of territory ln the Golan
rCglon r9pfovtd by IsraFIrl Knegset
. @r-ofcan Parltrneqg' I
- havlng regarc t<r thr dcclrlqn by .Iar6clte Knagset to anncx tcrritory inY, .the Go'en-Hclghtt, bhlch pdnrt!,tuttd.r Ugn-$lndad aitlon, rtvcalg
elcrrly llPanslonlltlc tradrncf,ea rn6 thrcatrna to lctd to a n€w arndd'
( confrontttion in thc rrgloni
. - having rcAer6 ta thG Jurttftably rharp rcactionc on th€ Part of Syrial
BgyPtandthaothcrlrtbcauntrlcllatalsobythcPl.o,whlchhave
bcen Provolt:d bY thir 
'cglon,
\, .- co'flrulng thc'dcctarltloil nado ln venlcc by tl: I'l'nbcr statds of '
the EuroPQan Comnunlticl,
lll'l t(nllalt Eo rovok' ltr dsclrlon:t. Callr on Isrr
2. Calle on tha Comorunlty udnnef $tatcl ParticiPatlng ln. the peacc-
lecplng'forccp tn the StnrI to cenccl thelr,';participation chould'
ietae| fall to rcvoko ltl decigloni
3. Callr .$pon thG cOUnc|l of ?orcign-liitlistere 'maeting ln politlcal
cooprrrtloa to trke lh.limredlrtc idtittlve cons{ltlng of tttlc.t
hea'urqrinaccordanagrlththt&eislonstakanatVcnicclnan
tflort to gchicv€ e pcaccful outcanc to the continaully deteriorating
brislr in thp t'ttddlc Etrl.
I
'Ji
'i,:If
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TIOIION FOR A RISOLUTION
iabled by ilr lpHnlulDls, ur lDlilou and ttr ALAVANOS
Furgurnf- to iulc a7 oi it\e iultg-of procedure
on thc rnr.iltlon. of thG OdUrr f,aidtrti'by tireel - .
i!9- Eu igPs-q n . Pt.r.llirgr!,
'.
' having regord to thc.f.ret thrt thc Governaont af l,sraer has rlocide,d
:o annGx th€ Gol$ fieighis. a rcalon rhfch under intcrnatl0nar treqtie,
belongc to Syria'qnd whieb ie. fOrclbly oceqpied tpday by Israel,
'-.-,j 
..
- whercas' ttrit..*igg1e{qqr'dfff. F€tlpg frr tha,prrr gf .r.arael ts.cgntra(y.
to .Resolutloris.io,,?{f and uo. r4s. of ane gnitel Nations and to rhe
fundamcntal principlci pf Inlornitional Lar,
- whereas this action la a cerioug thre..t to peace in the ttiddle East
and the entirc rorld,, capecially,at thc'prarcnB tine of internatiirnat
tension, tnd reprcacnt! .r prgvocation to rrl the Arab countries, :.
i.
1. severely condetrng thls !,nadntrelph.aad.dangergup 
,qction on thepart of th. tEraGll Govcrnnenti
2. Declarel tts fUll rolidayity wilh Syrla and all. the 
,other 
Arab
countrieg,
3. Calls on the governrantf af thq flehbtr stltcs to.takc.all suitable
step! et int.Enttional hvcl to havc thic aetlon by rarael condetnncd.
and,revoked;
4. Inettucts ltr.FfcgldeRt,ta fOrward th[c rerglution to the Couneil,
the govcrnacntr of tht Uanbar St+ter, thg govcrn$ntr of lsraet
and Syria.and the U}l E cqrlty Gogncil,
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the Europeqn Parliament,
- uhereas the continued
conetitutes a serioua
.,lediterranean,
MOTION FOII A RESOLUTION
rabled by Mr SEGRE and Mr CARDIA
pursurnt to Rule 47 of. thc Rules of procedure
on the annexation of the Goran ileightg by the state of rsrael
ANNEX 15
milit,ary occupatlon by Iarael of Arab territories
threat to peace in the Middle East and the
- whereas the poeition of IEraeI
to international law but also
to a Just and lac..ing solution
is not only illegitimate and contrary
repreBente the moEt serious obstacle
!o the problerns of the Middle East,
l. condenns icraeI'a declglon, followinE its anncxatlon of thc ca3tern part
of Jcrurllem, to rnnGx the Syrlan torrltorlee o! thc Go1an Hclghtrl
thcrcby provoklng vlgoroua rcaetlonr lrom nany guartGrs around thc
worldl
2. Ilequcats'rsrael to end its oceupatlon of the Arrb tcrritories by
withdrawing, in application in uN Reeorutlong No., 242 and 33E,
t,o wit,hin the frontlers fixed prlor to ihe war of .rune 1967;
3. CaIIs upon the Commission and the Council of the Ten to uildertake
a new and more vigorous potitical and dipromatic initiative, on
the basis of the venice declaration, with the ainr of promoting peace
and cooperat,ion among the pcoples of the Middle East and securing
recognition of the Palestinian peoplers right to self-determlnation
and to have a state of their own, whire respecting the autonomy
and security of alI States, including Iaracl;
4, rn':ructs ite preeldent to forward thls resorutlon
'-he commission and the Minigtera of Forergn Affairs
cooperation.
to th€ Council,
meetlng in pollt,lcal
PE z3.roelfin.lfnn.16\
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